

Critical social psychology – relevant researches / turning-points

Nr.	Citation:	Summary of procedure and results	Statement of Importance	Can an effect size be derived from the original report?	The key statistic and effect size information here:
1.	Boroditsky, L. (2000). Metaphoric Structuring: Understanding time through spatial metaphors. <i>Cognition</i> , 75(1), 1-28. (Study 1)	98 Stanford University undergraduates participated in the study as a course requirement. They filled out a two-page questionnaire on pencil and paper. The first page contained four true/false priming questions consisting of a picture and a description. The scenarios were constructed to prime either an ego-moving frame of reference or an object-moving frame of reference (see Fig. 2a and 2b of original article). Half the questions depicted movement to the left while half predicted movement to the right, and half the questions were true and half were false. On the next page, participants read an ambiguous temporal sentence (e.g. 'Next Wednesday's meeting has been moved forward two days') and were asked to indicate to which day the meeting had been rescheduled. Participants also indicated how confident they were in their answer on a 1-5 scale (1, not at all confident; 5, very confident). (There was also a control group that did not see the first page of the questionnaire, but that condition could likely be omitted). Of the participants primed in the ego-moving frame of reference, 73.3% thought that the meeting was on Friday, and 26.7% thought it was on Monday. Participants primed in the object-moving frame of reference showed the reverse bias. Only 30.8% of the participants primed in the object-moving frame of reference thought the meeting was on Friday, whereas 69.2% thought it was on Monday. A Chi-square test of the difference indicated a significant difference, Chi-squared (1, N = 56) = 5.2, P < .05. The confidence estimates were also analyzed and indicated those in the primed conditions were significantly more confident in their responses than those in the control condition, but this analysis can likely be omitted as it would require the third (control) group.	This is a highly cited (728 citations according to Google Scholar) and influential paper that involves a priming procedure. The original paper provides enough detail to construct a valid replication and it is suitable for cross-cultural adaptation.	Yes	Chi-squared (1, N = 56) = 5.2, P < .05, r = .305
2.	Alter, A. L., & Oppenheimer, D. M. (2008). Easy on the mind, easy on the wallet: The roles of familiarity and processing fluency in valuation judgments. <i>Psychonomic bulletin & review</i> , 15(5), 985-990. Experiment 1	Participants completed either a familiar-currency version or an unfamiliar-currency version of the questionnaire. The familiar-currency questionnaire contained a picture of a standard \$1 bill, whereas the unfamiliar-currency questionnaire contained a picture of a Susan B. Anthony \$1 coin. Susan B. Anthony coins are considerably rarer than \$1 bills. As predicted, participants in the familiar-currency condition believed that they could purchase more of each item, on average, with \$1 than did participants in the unfamiliar-currency condition	This study was suggested for nomination prior to the creation of this web form and is being submitted by one of the project leads on behalf of the original nominator. This study shows an interesting effect (fluency) that is well studied by the Oppenheimer research group and would be simple to implement.	Yes	[t(9) = 2.24, p = .015, partial eta-square = .54
3.	Original Muller Lyer Illusion is from 1896. These folks later show that it occurs more strongly among participants in the U.S. than those from other	Participants look at the Muller Lyer illusion (two lines, one with ends pointing outward; one with ends pointing inward) and guess which line is longer. IV = participant culture (East, West). Original paper says the effect occurs to a greater extent among U.S. participants, but not statistics are reported.	This study was suggested for nomination prior to the creation of this web form and is being submitted by one of the project leads on behalf of the original nominator.	No	

	cultures: Segall, M. H., Campbell, D. T., & Herskovits, M. J. (1966). The influence of culture on visual perception (p. 184). Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.		Basic perceptual study; cross-cultural differences		
4.	IJzerman, H., & Semin, G. R. (2010). Temperature perceptions as a ground for social proximity. <i>Journal of Experimental Social Psychology</i> , 46(6), 867-873. Experiment 2	<p>Ostensibly, participants were taking part in an experiment linking intuition to personality. They were first requested to choose one of five Chinese ideograms as an avatar to represent themselves. Afterwards, they were requested to describe themselves in terms of categories, behavior, and personality (supposedly linking their 'personality' to the avatar). Subsequently, they were shown a Chinese ideogram different from the previous five and were told that this ideogram was chosen by a previous participant, who had also described him/herself. In our experimental conditions participants were asked to 'examine the avatar and name three/ten similarities with the other' on the basis of the avatar. Participants were told that this experiment was designed to establish a link between intuition about an image and personality. In the first part, we asked the participants, after a set of unrelated questions, how similar they felt to the target-participant (1 (not similar at all) - 7 (very similar)). In the second part, again after a set of unrelated questions, we asked participants to estimate the ambient room temperature (in degrees Celsius) without examining the thermometer and how difficult they found the task (on a scale from 1 (not difficult at all) - (very difficult)).</p> <p>A univariate analysis of variance revealed that participants who were in the many similarities-condition ($M=20.62$, $SD=3.92$) perceived a marginally significantly higher ambient temperature than participants in the few similarities-condition ($M=18.05$, $SD=5.58$), $F(1, 48)=3.95$, $p=.052$.</p>	<p>This is one of the few "social priming" studies that can be administered online and meets all criteria of the project.</p> <p>(Submission by a project lead on behalf of someone who informally nominated this study)</p>	Yes	($M=18.05$, $SD=5.58$), $F(1, 48)=3.95$, $p=.052$,
5.	IJzerman, H., & Semin, G. R. (2010). Temperature perceptions as a ground for social proximity. <i>Journal of Experimental Social Psychology</i> , 46(6), 867-873. (Study 4)	<p>Rick's note: This submission is a different study from the same paper in the above submission. They are exactly the same except this version asks participants to describe differences, instead of similarities.</p> <p>Difference priming and temperature perception. Ostensibly, participants were taking part in an experiment linking intuition to personality. They were first requested to choose one of five Chinese ideograms as an avatar to represent themselves. Afterwards, they were requested to describe themselves in terms of categories, behavior, and personality (supposedly linking their 'personality' to the avatar). Subsequently, they were shown a Chinese ideogram different from the previous five and were told that this ideogram was chosen by a previous participant, who had also described him/herself. In the experimental conditions participants were asked to 'examine the avatar and name three/ten differences with the other' on the basis of the avatar. Participants were told that this experiment was designed to establish a link between intuition about an image and personality. The authors asked participants to estimate the ambient room temperature (in degrees Celsius) without examining the thermometer and how difficult they found the task (on a scale from 1 (not difficult at all) - (very difficult; ideally, these questions should be counterbalanced).</p> <p>NOTES 1) I am the first author of this study, and I am interested in the replicability of the</p>	<p>This study could be categorized as a "social priming/embodiment" study, and has been reasonably cited (62 times since 2010). There could be differences across countries, but possibly mostly in the effect sizes, not the direction of the effect.</p>	Yes	$t(34)=2.46$, $p=.019$, Cohen's $d=.97$

		<p>effect and how well it generalizes across contexts (it does mean I put our work on the line, which in some way nerve-wracking!).</p> <p>2) To some extent I am concerned if the study is put together with other social tasks, but ManyLabs1 showed great ways to get rid of this problem.</p> <p>3) I would suggest two analyses. First, the analyses as reported in the paper (as confirmatory analyses). Second, I have observed in other contexts (Zhong & Leonardelli, 2009), that the standard deviation can be larger and would suggest excluding participants scoring on reported temperature perceptions 2 SD above or below the mean (as exploratory analyses).</p> <p>4) Room temperature should be recorded. If room temperature cannot be recorded, then I would recommend using a smaller estimated effect size (conservative guess: 50%).</p> <p>I can be reached at h.ijzerman@uvt.nl</p>			
6.	Zhong, C. B., & Leonardelli, G. J. (2008). Cold and Lonely Does Social Exclusion Literally Feel Cold?. <i>Psychological Science</i> , 19(9), 838-842.	<p>This experiment investigated whether recalling a past experience of social exclusion can induce the feeling of coldness, measured by estimated room temperature. A total of 65 undergraduates at the University of Toronto voluntarily participated in exchange for course credit. Upon arrival, participants were led to a cubicle and told that the experiment consisted of several unrelated tasks. In the first task, they were randomly assigned to one of two conditions, recalling a situation in which they felt socially excluded or included. Afterward, the experimenter asked participants to estimate the current room temperature. As a cover story, the experimenter explained that this information was requested by the lab maintenance staff. None of the participants indicated they had any suspicion. The temperature estimates ranged from 12 to 40 C. As expected, participants who recalled the experience of being socially excluded gave lower estimates of the room temperature ($M = 21.44$, $SD = 3.09$) than those who recalled being included ($M = 24.02$, $SD = 6.61$), $t(63) = 2.02$, $prep = .88$. Only difficulty with this one is the cover story about maintenance wanting to know the temperature -- hard for online and some lab locations.</p>	Another social priming study.	Yes	As expected, participants who recalled the experience of being socially excluded gave lower estimates of the room temperature ($M = 21.44$, $SD = 3.09$) than those who recalled being included ($M = 24.02$, $SD = 6.61$), $t(63) = 2.02$, $prep = .88$.
7.	Meier, B. P., Hauser, D. J., Robinson, M. D., Friesen, C. K., & Schjeldahl, K. (2007). What's "up" with God? Vertical space as a representation of the divine. <i>Journal of personality and social psychology</i> , 93(5), 699.	<p>In Experiment 2, we sought to examine whether a manipulation of vertical position would affect the encoding of God- and Devil related words. Participants were asked to categorize words as being related to God or the Devil as the words randomly appeared near the top or bottom of a computer screen. Our hypothesis was that participants should be faster to categorize a God-related word when it is presented at the top (vs. bottom) of the screen, whereas the reverse should occur for Devil-related words. Has more than two conditions but can likely be adapted in a way that keeps the original design while focusing only on the fact that God related words are categorized faster when at the top of the screen (or that devil related words are categorized faster when at the bottom of the screen). Or could keep the interaction because it's a within-subjects design and thus likely to have sufficient power. There was an interaction such that participants were significantly faster to categorize God-related words at the top of the screen and devil-related words at the bottom of the screen.</p>	Cited 100 times Interesting topic, embodiment-ISH	Yes	
8.	Schubert, T. W. (2005). Your highness: vertical positions as perceptual symbols of power. <i>Journal of personality and social psychology</i> , 89(1), 1. (Study 2)	<p>In each trial, participants saw labels of two social groups above each other on a screen and had to decide either which one was the powerful or which one was the powerless group; this was manipulated between participants and formed the first factor task. Each of the pairs was presented twice, once with the powerful group at the top and once with the powerful group at the bottom. This formed the second factor position (top vs. bottom), which was manipulated within subjects. Answers</p>	This is one of the most highly cited papers in the "social embodiment" literature (269 times).	Yes	When the task was to find the powerful group, reactions were indeed faster when it was at the top, compared with when it was at the bottom. Simple

		<p>had to be given with the cursor up and down keys. Thus, whatever group the participants had to find, they had to press the up key when it was at the top and the down key when it was at the bottom. In sum, the experiment had a 2 (task: find powerful vs. find powerless, between) \times 2 (position: top vs. bottom, within) design.</p> <p>Altogether, 24 pairs of social groups were used. For each pair, a pretest had shown that the one group was almost unanimously judged to be more powerful than the other group (pairs are listed in the Appendix). In a further pretest, 34 participants were presented with the group pairs and were asked to decide which of the two groups they liked more on a scale from 1 (more liking for the powerful group) to 5 (more liking for the powerless group).³ The mean of the averaged ratings ($M = 3.21$, $SD = .29$) differed significantly from the scale midpoint (3), $t(33) = 4.23$, $p < .001$, indicating that the powerful groups were on average liked less than the powerless groups.</p> <p>In the reaction time task, each pair was presented twice, resulting in 48 trials. Order of presentation was randomized, and it was counterbalanced for each pair whether it first appeared with the powerful at the top or at the bottom. Each trial started with a blank screen for 750 ms and a fixation cross (\square) in the middle of the screen, which disappeared after 250 ms, followed by a pair of groups above each other, centered vertically and horizontally on the screen, with five blank lines between them. (Thus, the fixation cross was located directly in the middle between the two labels.) When no answer was given after 2 s, the program continued. Feedback on too long or wrong answers was not given. Words appeared in black 10-point Arial letters on a white background. The study was run on laptops with 14-in. displays (resolution 1024×768) and programmed in DMDX (Forster & Forster, 2003). The laptops stood on tables, at which the participants were seated. Thus, the participants had to look down at the laptop screen.</p> <p>The grand mean of all response latencies was 1,095 ms. Following the recommendations of Bargh and Chartrand (2000), I planned to exclude all response latencies longer than three standard deviations above the mean; however, this criterion equaled 1,980 ms in this study, probably because each trial was terminated automatically after 2,000 ms anyway. Consequently, no response latencies were excluded in this study, and the maximum response latency was increased in the following studies. Latencies of responses in which the to-be-found group was at the top were averaged to one score, and reactions in which the to-be-found group was at the bottom were averaged to a second score. Note that top answers were required when the task was to find the powerful group and it was at the top (compatible trials), but they were also required when the task was to find the powerless group and it was at the top (incompatible trials). Likewise, bottom answers were required when the task was to find the powerless group and it was at the bottom (compatible trials), but they were also required when the task was to find the powerful group and it was at the bottom (incompatible trials). It was hypothesized that for both tasks, the reactions in the compatible trials would be faster than in the incompatible trials.</p>			<p>effects analyses confirmed that this difference was significant, $F(1, 78) = 11.91$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .13$. The opposite was the case when the task was to find the powerless group. Here, reactions were faster when it was at the bottom, compared with when it was at the top. This difference was less pronounced but still significant, $F(1, 78) = 4.12$, $p < .046$, $\eta^2 = .05$. Together, these differences resulted in a significant interaction, $F(1, 78) = 14.82$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .16$.</p>
9.	Study 2 - Maass, A., Colombo, A., Colombo, A., & Sherman, S. J. (2001). Inferring traits	Participants are asked to listen to a list of characteristics associated to an anonymous individual. Subsequently participants fill in a Need for Cognition questionnaire and a Memory recognition test.	The Induction Deduction Asymmetry provide important information about the basic mechanisms adopted by	Yes	Cohen's $d = 2.56$ Effect size 0.79

	<p>from behaviors versus behaviors from traits: The induction–deduction asymmetry. <i>Journal of personality and social psychology</i>, 81(3), 391.</p>	<p>Results showed that traits implied by a behavior are more frequently misidentified as already seen than behaviors implied by a trait. Response-time data in Experiment 2 further suggest that inferences from behaviors to traits are made on-line, whereas inferences from traits to behaviors appear to be memory based.</p>	<p>individuals in forming an impression of others. It has potential applications in impression formation, interpersonal relationships, communication and I think it can be an underlying process in stereotype formation and transmission. The original paper has several DVs but think the Inference score (mistakenly identifying the implied trait/behaviour as already seen is the most interesting one.</p>		
10.	<p>Van Lange, P. A., De Bruin, E., Otten, W., & Joireman, J. A. (1997). Development of prosocial, individualistic, and competitive orientations: theory and preliminary evidence. <i>Journal of personality and social psychology</i>, 73(4), 733. (I would recommend replicating at least the first three studies. This can be done easily, as I will indicate below).</p>	<p>I will list the variables that were measured</p> <p>Study 1 Procedure</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In the current study, we used a nine- item decomposed game measure of social value orientation, an efficient and easy-to-administer instrument that was adopted from prior research - Measurement of levels of secure, avoidant, and anxious-ambivalent attachment was based on a 13-item measure adapted from Hazan and Shaver (1987) and validated by Camelley and Janoff-Bulman (1992). However, given that the purpose of Study 1 was to assess general attachment styles (i.e., attachment relevant to one's interpersonal dealings with others in general, not with one's close relationship partner per se), we excluded items that involved attachment to the current partner (e.g., "I worry that a love partner might not really love me"). Therefore, five items were used to assess level of secure attachment (e.g., "I find it easy to trust others," "I find it easy to get close to others", and "I feel comfortable having other people depend on me"); level of avoidant attachment was measured by using three items (e.g., " I am nervous when anyone gets too close"); finally, level of anxious-ambivalent attachment was assessed by using three items (e.g., " I find that other people don't want to get as close as I would like"). <p>Study 2:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The survey included an instrument measuring individuals' social value orientation and an instrument measuring levels of secure, avoidant, and anxious-ambivalent attachment. Social value orientations were measured as in Study 1 (see Appendix). - In measuring levels of secure, avoidant, and anxious-ambivalent attachment, we used descriptions adapted from Hazan and Shaver's (1987) three-prototype descriptions of how people typically feel in relationships. In light of the present purposes, there were three notable differences between Hazan and Shaver's measure and the present measure (for differences, see paper). <p>Study 3:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In all studies, social value orientation was assessed as in Studies 1 and 2. - The questionnaire asked participants to list the total number of siblings older than themselves, the total number of siblings younger than themselves, as well as the total number of brothers and the total number of sisters. The data of three participants were discarded because of missing values. <p>Participant Numbers per Study:</p>	<p>The study of social value orientation has been an extremely important topic in the social psychological literature. It is of value both to interdependence theory, and to game theorists (in behavioral economics). Furthermore, comparing SVO across different labs would be important theoretically, as some authors have suggested that the ratio for prosocials for different disciplines (economics vs. psychology) and different countries tend to vary.</p> <p>Furthermore, the present paper is important, as it links an important theory from how people build trusting relationships from developmental psychology (attachment theory) to an important theory in social psychology (interdependence theory), as is also evidenced by the amount of citations in Google Scholar (585 at the time of writing).</p> <p>There seem to be some "buts" to this study: the samples are large, and the effects seem to be small at first sight. ManyLabs procedure could verify these results quite well.</p>	No	

1. 573
2. 136
3. 631

As one can see, the three studies are very similar. With the randomization procedure used in ManyLabs2, it is also possible to check for order effects (e.g., placing Attachment Measure 1 first, then SVO measurement or placing Attachment Measure 2 first).

Results Study 1:

We conducted a 3 (social value orientation: prosocials vs. individualists vs. competitors) X 2 (gender: women vs. men) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with the three-item measures of secure, anxious-ambivalent, and avoidant attachment styles as dependent measures. This analysis revealed a multivariate main effect for social value orientation, $F(6, 886) = 3.05, p < .01$. At the univariate level, the main effect for social value orientation was significant for level of secure attachment, $F(2, 444) = 7.07, p < .001$, and marginal for both level of avoidant attachment, $F(2, 444) = 2.47, p < .10$, and level of anxious-ambivalent attachment, $F(2, 444) = 2.76, p < .10$. The two-factor MANOVA did not reveal any effects involving gender, indicating that the association of social value orientation and secure attachment is independent of participant's gender.

Consistent with the prosocial-security hypothesis, prosocials ($M = 6.24, SD = 1.38$) exhibited greater levels of secure attachment than did individualists ($M = 5.92, SD = 1.35$) or competitors ($M = 5.51, SD = 1.59$). Subsequent planned comparisons revealed a significant contrast between prosocials versus individualists and competitors, $F(1, 444) = 11.09, p < .001$, and a marginal difference between individualists and competitors, $F(1, 444) = 3.04, p < .10$. These findings are presented in Figure 1.

Second, congruent with the prosocial-security hypothesis, contrasts relevant to the marginal relationship between social value orientation and avoidant attachment revealed that prosocials ($M = 3.56, SD = 1.61$) exhibited lower levels of avoidant attachment than did individualists ($M = 3.92, SD = 1.48$) and competitors ($M = 3.86, SD = 1.48$), respectively, $F(1, 444) = 4.88, p < .05$. The contrast between individualists and competitors was not significant. Finally, relevant to the marginal relationship between social value orientation and levels of anxious-ambivalent attachment, subsequent comparisons revealed a significant contrast of prosocials ($M = 4.93, SD = 1.60$) versus individualists ($M = 4.63, SD = 1.71$) and competitors ($M = 4.55, SD = 1.80$), respectively, $F(1, 444) = 4.63, p < .05$. The contrast between individualists and competitors was not significant.

Study 2:

We conducted a 3 (social value orientation) X 2 (gender) MANOVA, with the measures of secure, anxious-ambivalent, and avoidant attachment styles as dependent measures. This analysis revealed a significant multivariate main effect for social value orientation, $F(6, 222) = 3.27, p < .005$. At the univariate level, the main effect for social value orientation was found to be significant for level of secure attachment, $F(2, 112) = 5.53, p < .005$, and nonsignificant for both level of avoidant attachment, $F(2, 112) = 2.54$, and level of anxious-ambivalent at-

tachment, $F(2, 112) = .12$. The two-factor MANOVA did not reveal any effects involving gender, indicating that the association of social value orientation and secure attachment is independent of participant's gender.

As can be seen in Figure 2, prosocials ($M = 5.25, SD = 1.90$) exhibited greater levels of secure attachment than did individualists ($M = 4.91, SD = 1.76$) or competitors ($M = 3.68, SD = 2.14$). Consistent with the prosocial-security hypothesis, planned comparisons revealed significant contrasts between prosocials versus individualists and competitors, $F(1, 112) = 4.94, p < .05$, and between individualists and competitors, $F(1, 112) = 6.11, p < .05$.

Study 3:
The association between social value orientation and number of siblings was analyzed by using a 3 (social value orientation: prosocials vs. individualists vs. competitors) \times 2 (gender: women vs. men) analysis of variance (ANCOVA). Of course, this analysis did not assume that social value orientation causes variations in the so-called dependent measures—indeed, the reverse order of causation is more plausible. We used the ANOVA framework because the dependent measure complied with a ratio level of measurement (i.e., the same holds for the other dependent measures, including number of siblings older than the participant, the number of siblings younger than the participant, the number of brothers, and the number of sisters). This analysis revealed a significant main effect for social value orientation, $F(2, 535) = 4.82, p < .01$. Consistent with the sibling-prosocial hypothesis, Panel A of Figure 3 reveals that the number of siblings is greater for prosocials ($M = 2.03, SD = 1.56$) than for individualists ($M = 1.63, SD = 1.00$) and competitors ($M = 1.71, SD = 1.35$). Subsequent planned comparisons revealed a significant contrast between prosocials versus individualists and competitors, $F(2, 535) = 9.14, p < .005$. Differences between individualists and competitors were not significant. The 3 \times 2 ANOVA did not reveal any other significant effects (i.e., main or interaction effects involving gender).

Next, we conducted a 3 (social value orientation) \times 2 (gender) MANOVA on the number of older siblings, the number of younger siblings, the number of brothers, and the number of sisters. This analysis revealed a multivariate main effect for social value orientation, $F(8, 1066) = 1.99, p < .05$. At the univariate level, we found a significant main effect for social value orientation for number of older siblings, $F(2, 535) = 3.64, p < .05$, and number of sisters, $F(2, 535) = 6.16, p < .005$. First, Panel B of Figure 3 reveals that the number of older siblings was greater for prosocials ($M = 0.96, SD = 1.25$) than for individualists ($M = 0.67, SD = 0.79$). Subsequent comparisons revealed a significant contrast between prosocials versus individualists and competitors, $F(2, 535) = 4.94, p < .05$. Differences between individualists and competitors ($M = 0.90, SD = 1.02$) were not significant. Second, Panel C of Figure 3 reveals that the number of sisters was greater for prosocials ($M = 1.05, SD = 1.14$) than for individualists ($M = 0.74, SD = 0.75$) or competitors ($M = 0.76, SD = 0.88$). Subsequent comparisons revealed a significant contrast between prosocials versus individualists and competitors, $F(1, 535) = 12.27, p < .001$. Differences between individualists and competitors were not significant. The 3 \times 2 ANOVAs did not reveal any other significant effects

		(i.e., main or interaction effects involving gender). Although several specific explanations may account for these findings, they are congruent with the more general assumption that differences in social value orientation are partially rooted in different patterns of social interaction as experienced, at least in part, during the periods spanning early childhood to young adulthood.			
11.	Elliot, A.J., & Niesta, D. (2008). Romantic red: Red enhances men's attraction to women. <i>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</i> , 95, 1150-1164. Study 1	In Study 1, experimenters presented male (N=27) participants with a female photo on a red or a white background and examined whether they would perceive the woman placed on the red background as more attractive.	Cited 137 times, always interesting topic, very small original sample, Authors claims universality of the effect: Elliot, A. J., Tracy, J. L., Pazda, A. D., & Beall, A. T. (2012). Red enhances women's attractiveness to men: First evidence suggesting universality. <i>Journal of Experimental Social Psychology</i> .	Yes	The analysis revealed a significant effect of color, $t(25) = 2.88$, $p = .01$, $d = 1.11$, 95% CI for d (.75, 1.48).
12.	Miyamoto, Y., & Kitayama, S. (2002). Cultural variation in correspondence bias: The critical role of attitude diagnosticity of socially constrained behavior. <i>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</i> , 83,1239-1248.	The suggested materials are from Miyamoto and Kitayama's (2002) Study 1. Participants in that experiment were randomly assigned to read an essay ostensibly written by a student that was either in favor of or opposed to capital punishment. Although the researchers also varied whether participants read a long, persuasive essay or a short, nonpersuasive essay, I suggest using only the nonpersuasive-essay conditions in ManyLabs 2. The nonpersuasive-essay conditions showed stronger effects, and the materials are considerably shorter. After reading the essay, participants read that the writer's professor had assigned him the position to argue. Then participants reported what they thought the writer's true attitude about capital punishment was. Although participants also reported what attitude they thought the writer would convey if he could do so freely, the results were slightly stronger with the true-attitude question, so this is the dependent variable I would recommend using. Here are the original results for the suggested conditions and dependent variable, from Table 1 on p. 1242: From Table 1 on p. 1242: Among the American participants in the short-unpersuasive essay condition, the difference between the pro-essay condition ($M = 10.82$, $SD = 3.47$) and anti-essay condition ($M = 3.30$, $SD = 2.62$) was significant, $t(98) = 6.66$, $p < .001$. Among the Japanese participants in the short-unpersuasive essay condition, the difference between the pro-essay condition ($M = 9.27$, $SD = 2.88$) and anti-essay condition ($M = 7.02$, $SD = 3.06$) was not significant, $t(98) = 1.84$, ns.	The correspondence bias has been called one of the most fundamental phenomena in social psychology (Gilbert & Malone, 1995). However, it is far from universal. Research shows this bias is stronger in European-American cultures than East Asian cultures (Choi, Nisbett & Norenzayan, 1999). Additionally, only 53% of participants in a US representative sample showed the bias (Bauman & Skitka, 2010). The instructions and essays in the suggested conditions are brief, and the main dependent variable is a single question.	Yes	From Table 1 on p. 1242: Among the American participants in the short-unpersuasive essay condition, the difference between the pro-essay condition ($M = 10.82$, $SD = 3.47$) and anti-essay condition ($M = 3.30$, $SD = 2.62$) was significant, $t(98) = 6.66$, $p < .001$, $d = 2.45$. Among the Japanese participants in the short-unpersuasive essay condition, the difference between the pro-essay condition ($M = 9.27$, $SD = 2.88$) and anti-essay condition ($M = 7.02$, $SD = 3.06$) was not significant, $t(98) = 1.84$, ns, $d = .76$
13.	Chang, L., Lu, H. J., Li, H., & Li, T. (2011). The face that launched a thousand ships: The mating-warring association in men. <i>Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin</i> , 37(7), 976-984.	The Study 2 check if a mating-warring association among young heterosexual men exists. And verifies operational hypothesis that male, but not female, participants exposed to attractive, as compared to unattractive, opposite-sex photographs were significantly faster in responding to images of war. The two primes were photographs of 20 attractive and 20 unattractive Chinese female or male faces. The targets were 20 pictures depicting war scenes and 20	The researchers concluded "... This is among the first empirical studies to examine the potential mating-warring association. ... As such this study adds to the diversities of evidence on the effects of mating motives in human males as well as motivating further	Yes	

	<p>Study 2</p>	<p>pictures depicting farm scenes. With a background of a war scene or a farm scene, each picture had a male soldier carrying a weapon or a male farmer carrying a farming tool standing in a forward position.</p> <p>The participants' task was to identify whether the male figure appeared in the left or right of the picture by pressing one of two keys on the keyboard using the index and middle fingers of the right hand. Response time was used as the dependent variable (access to war-related cognition as a function of the mating prime).</p> <p>All conditions were manipulated within participants with each administered 40 trials after 8 practice trials. In each trial, after a 100-ms orienting stimulus (+), a prime picture appeared for 400 ms and was followed by a 116-ms blank screen, and a target picture appeared on the screen until the participant gave a response.</p> <p>For male participants, there was a significant interaction effect between prime and target, $F(1, 30) = 10.18, p < .01, \eta^2 = .25$. Male participants responded faster to war scenes when primed by attractive female faces ($M = 431.30, SD = 59.49$ ms) than by unattractive female faces ($M = 445.89, SD = 53.28$ ms), $t(30) = -3.74, p < .001; d = 0.66$, whereas there was no statistical difference between the attractive ($M = 455.82, SD = 58.30$) and unattractive face priming ($M = 449.00, SD = 52.35$), $t(30) = 1.23, p = .23$, in processing farm scenes.</p> <p>For female participants, there was neither the interaction nor the main effect.</p>	<p>discussions of the origins of human warfare.", and achieved only 7 citation. If mating-warring association effect exists, the authors deserve more and Manylab Project replication will give them a kick.</p>		
14.	<p>Rule, N. O., & Ambady, N. (2008). The face of success: Inferences from Chief Executive Officers' appearance predict company profits. <i>Psychological Science</i>, 19, 109-111.</p>	<p>People rated faces of executives (top and bottom 25 of the Fortune 500) for warmth, competence and (in a separate sample) leadership. Ratings of competence were correlated with the financial performance of the company the executive led. For the purposes of this experiment competence only ratings (three questions) for the fifty faces should suffice.</p>	<p>This finding (and other related "thin slices" studies) has attracted a lot of attention. The implications are surprising and far reaching, suggesting that people can detect traits in others based on facial appearance alone- even those they wish to hide - and these traits are related to real world outcomes - even those dependent on numerous exogenous factors.</p> <p>These findings have been replicated many times, but from a limited number of labs. Moreover, these findings should be sensitive to cultural and other demographic variations. For example - this study relied on students at a private East Coast, American university, who may be aware of subtle signals of business success that others are not.</p>	Yes	$r = .36, r^2 = .12$
15.	<p>Rule, N. O., Ambady, N., Adams Jr, R. B., & Macrae, C. N. (2008). Accuracy and awareness in the perception and categorization of male sexual</p>	<p>Study 1 - Participants viewed faces of 80 gay or straight individuals and rated them according to sexual orientation on a 1-4 scale. Ratings were collapsed into a dichotomous judgment. Participants were able to identify gay individuals at above chance levels.</p>	<p>This finding (and other related "thin slices" studies) has attracted a lot of attention. The implications are surprising and far reaching, suggesting that people can detect traits in others</p>	Yes	$r = .31, r^2 = .09$

	orientation. Journal of personality and social psychology, 95(5), 1019.		<p>based on facial appearance alone- even those they wish to hide - and these traits are related to real world outcomes - even those dependent on numerous exogenous factors.</p> <p>These findings have been replicated many times, but from a limited number of labs. Moreover, these findings should be sensitive to cultural and other demographic variations. For example, signals of sexual orientation may vary across cultures, as may individuals awareness of these signals and ability to detect them.</p>		
16.	<p>Srull, T. K., & Wyer, R. S. (1979). The role of category accessibility in the interpretation of information about persons: Some determinants and implications. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37(10), 1660. Study 1.</p>	<p>Participants performed a sentence unscrambling task which activated concepts of either aggressiveness (Study 1) or kindness (Study 2), they then evaluated the behavior of an ambiguous target. Crucially, in each experiment, the proportion of trait relevant primes and the number of trait relevant primes were varied, with both showing substantial effects. The proposed replication would focus only on the proportion of trait sentences that pertain to the activated trait.</p>	<p>This is a classic priming experiment. Given the failure of newer, flashier "social priming" experiments, it seems important to go back to basics and investigate whether the older and more modest claims of earlier priming research replicate. This will help isolate the scope of the "problem" studies that are fragile and difficult to replicate.</p> <p>As an additional advantage, the effect is large and it has been widely replicated. At the same time, there is a large literature documenting that priming effect sizes are depended on numerous factors. This suggests that there could be a high degree of variability across samples.</p>	No	<p>Simple effects are not reported, but the effect size seems quite large. The effect of interest for the proposed replication is $F(1,72) = 590.67$, p obviously $< .001$ - but this is averaged across participants who experienced no delay between priming and impression formation and participants who experienced a substantial (>24 hours!) delay. The effect size in the "immediate" condition is probably yet larger.</p>
17.	<p>Whitson, J. A., & Galinsky, A. D. (2008). Lacking control increases illusory pattern perception. Science, 322(5898), 115-117. Study 5.</p>	<p>Participants recalled an experience when they had (lacked) control. Participants then completed a Snow Pictures task in which they viewed grainy pictures that may or may not contain an image. Participants who felt a lack of control saw more images in Snowy Pictures that did not actually contain them than participants who felt in control.</p>	<p>This is a highly cited paper (>200 times) in a premiere journal (Science). It consists of six studies, all of which have <25 participants per condition. These studies have an distribution of p values that calls into question the evidential value of this finding (Ex1 $p = .05$, Ex2 $p = .09$, Ex3 $p = .05/.02$, Ex4 $p = .04/p=.04$, Ex5 $p=.03/.02$, EX6 $p = .04$, see Simonsohn, Nelson & Simmons, 2013 for a discussion). Subsequent close replications seem to have a similar pattern of results. This may provide a good test case for the p-hacking debate by illustrating whether the results of numerous underpowered studies are</p>	Yes	<p>Study 5 $d = .70$ Study 2 (same d_v, different manipulation) $d = .74$ Study 3 (same i_v, different d_v) $d = .65$</p>

			predictive of replication using a large sample.		
18.	Two bears with one stone Muraven, M., Tice, D. M., & Baumeister, R. F. (1998). Self-control as a limited resource: Regulatory depletion patterns. <i>Journal of personality and social psychology</i> , 74(3), 774. Study 2	This study replicates and extends Wegner et al.'s classic "White Bear study. In this version, participants either list thoughts related to white bears or unrelated to white bears, and check a box each time a white bear came to mind. Following this (6min) task, participants had the opportunity to work on unsolvable anagrams. Following a manipulation check for difficulty, the dependent measure was how long they persisted on this task. People asked to suppress their thoughts did not persist as long on the anagram task. Note that the design also included a no thought control condition that differed from the suppress condition but not the express condition. Dropping the no thought control allows for close replication of Wegner's original study (which predicts more checkmarks - results unreported in Muraven's paper) and direct replication of Muraven's finding in a simple two condition experiment.	These two lines of research have had a massive influence, both of these papers have been cited more than 1000 times. The White Bear finding seems to be robust, the self-control findings may be less so. I have heard that people have difficulty replicating this effect, and most of the more influential papers on this topic rely on small sample sizes.	Yes	d = 1.17 based on means provided in table. $t(32) = 3.40$, $p < .001$ according to text.
19.	Aarts, H., & Dijksterhuis, A. (2003). The silence of the library: Environment, situational norm, and social behavior. <i>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</i> , 84(1), 18–28. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.84.1.18	The proposition is to replicate the Experiment 2. Sixty-nine students took part. Three experimental conditions: goal library prime condition (library picture plus the goal to visit it), goal control prime condition (railway station condition picture plus the goal to visit the library) and no-goal-library priming condition (library picture without the goal to visit it). In the experimental condition participants were exposed to a picture of a library, showing the interior design of it (hence, this condition is referred to as the goal-library prime condition). The participants in the other condition were shown a picture of a railway station, showing an empty platform. Because the latter group of participants was not primed with an environment typically associated with the norm of behaving silently, this condition can be treated as a goal-control prime condition. Apart from the goal-control prime and goal-library prime condition we added a no-goal condition: One third of the participants were also exposed to the library picture. However, instead of anticipating a visit to the environment, these participants were merely asked to carefully scrutinize the picture. Because these participants were not instigated with the goal to visit the library, this condition is referred to as the no-goal-library prime condition. The dependent measure was word pronunciation task assessing the sound pressure level of participants voice in dB(A). To keep the distance fixed, the micro- phone was placed 10 cm away from the mouth of the participants. Immediately after the word pronunciation task, a modified version of the Affect–Arousal Scale was administered. Furthermore, as part of a larger questionnaire on activities in daily life, participants were asked to indicate how often they had visited the library in the past month. The effect of prime was significant, $F(2,63) = 3.46$, $p < .04$. Planned comparison revealed that participants' voices in the goal-library condition ($M = 83.16$) were reliably less loud than participants' voices in the goal-control condition ($M = 84.48$), $F(1, 63) = 4.98$, $p < .03$, and in the no-goal-library condition ($M = 84.62$), $F(1, 63) = 5.83$, $p < .02$.	It is a highly-cited paper (more than 300 citations). Its evidence is about a key social psychology process, social influence, trying to explore the automatic nature of compliance to social norms. The replication of such study is important concerning its impact on the theoretical comprehension of the automaticity of such fundamental social psychological phenomena.	Yes	
20.	Bos, M. W., Dijksterhuis, A., & Baaren, R. B. V. (2008). On the goal-dependency of unconscious thought. <i>Journal of Experimental Social Psychology</i> , 44(4), 1114-1120.	Experiment 3: 1. Information about alternatives in a decision problem are presented (3 cars and 3 roommates) is presented 2. Two groups: One group has the goal to pick the best alternative out of the cars, one group will pick the best roommate	The unconscious thought effect has received much attention, both from researchers as in the media. It has been studied in a large variety of different contexts, from consumer behaviour, to clinical decision making, education (learning) and even decision making in	Yes	See: Strick, M., Dijksterhuis, A., Bos, M. W., Sjoerdsma, A., van Baaren, R. B., & Nordgren, L. F. (2011). A meta-analysis on

	Experiment 3	<p>3. Participants are distracted by another task (few minutes)</p> <p>4. Participants rate all items (3 cars, 3 roommates)</p> <p>Results:</p> <p>The predicted interaction was significant, $F(1, 136) = 4.12, p < .05, \eta^2 = .03$.</p>	<p>the court room.</p> <p>What is curious is that it is one of the few contemporary psychological effects with a large number of failed published direct and conceptual replications, that apparently have no influence on its evaluation as a true effect. Most negative results are published in one journal: Judgement and Decision making. Positive evidence is published in Psychological Science, Science and other high impact psychology journals.</p> <p>Failed replications are often claimed to be the result of cultural differences (see meta-analysis referred to below)</p>		<p>unconscious thought effects. <i>Social Cognition</i>, 29(6), 738-762.</p> <p>http://static.squarespace.com/static/516d8a63e4b0bb1f91d5ce7b/51ba2b9be4b0e223f838a907/1371155355021/3.%20Nordgren%20Unconscious%20thought%20meta-analysis.pdf</p>
21.	<p>Li, Y., Johnson, E. J., & Zaval, L. (2011). Local warming: Daily temperature deviation affects beliefs and concern about climate change. <i>Psychological Science</i>, 22, 454-459.</p> <p>Study 1</p>	<p>The study investigated perceived day's temperature on climate change beliefs in general samples from the USA (N=582) and Australia (N=290). (The two sets of data were combined for analyses.) Participants reported their global warming belief ("How convinced are you that global warming is happening?") and global warming concern ("How much do you personally worry about global warming?"). Response options ranged from 0 (not at all convinced/worried) to 3 (completely convinced/a great deal worried), and these global warming questions were always asked in this order. Perceived deviation from the usual temperature ("Is the temperature in your city colder or warmer than usual today for this time of year?") was measured with a 5-point scale that ranged from -2 (much colder) to 2 (much warmer).</p> <p>Researchers counterbalanced the order of the global-warming and temperature questions. Results from simple linear regressions confirmed the predicted effects of perceived temperature deviation on both global-warming belief, $\beta = 0.28, t(872) = 7.86, p < .0001$, and concern, $\beta = 0.25, t(872) = 8.61, p < .0001$. In other words, participants who thought that day was warmer than usual believed more in and had greater concern about global warming compared to those who thought that day was colder than usual.</p>	<p>This study address a well-debated and contested topic (climate change), is simple and easy to implement, and is already highly cited (44 citations since 2011).</p> <p>One drawback is that the study was conducted in a single month (February, 2010), meaning winter in the USA and summer in Australia. We will not be able to conduct the study in a single month. However, since ManyLabs2 will involve research groups from both hemispheres, we will have contrasting seasonal data which would provide evidence (or not) for the replicability of the finding.</p> <p>We could also run similar additional analyses reported by the authors considering actual temperatures on the days of data collection and historical averages of ManyLabs 2 sites.</p>	Yes	<p>global-warming belief: $\beta = 0.28, t(872) = 7.86, p < .0001$</p> <p>global-warming concern: $\beta = 0.25, t(872) = 8.61, p < .0001$</p>
22.	<p>Fitzsimons, G. M., & Bargh, J. A. (2003). Thinking of you: Nonconscious pursuit of interpersonal goals associated with relationship partners. <i>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</i>, 84(1), 148-</p>	<p>Participants answered a questionnaire in which they were asked to think of a friend (vs. a coworker) whom they knew quite well. They subsequently wrote down the friend's (or coworker's) initials and answered eight questions that allegedly measured how well they knew the person. After answering the questions, participants read a sentence thanking them for completing the study and informing them that the experimenter was interested in their opinions on doing such studies in public places, allegedly for use in planning future studies. The first question</p>	<p>The article was cited over 450 times. It is simple to implement, involves social priming and the main effect may depend on cultural variations in the nature of goals regarding coworkers and friends (which may be measured using the instruments of the qualitative study of</p>	Yes	

	164. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.84.1.148 (Study 1)	asked for participants' hypothetical willingness to participate in a longer (10–15 min) study and was to be answered using a 9-point scale, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (completely). They were also asked whether they were willing to actually do a 10–15-min study immediately following completion of this study. To answer, participants circled YES or NO. Those in the friend-priming condition were significantly more likely to agree to do another study than were those in the coworker-priming condition, $\chi^2(1, N = 33) = 4.16, p = .04$. 9 out of 17 participants in the friend-priming condition agreed to do a second study, versus 3 out of 16 in the coworker-priming condition. Those in the friend-priming condition were significantly more willing ($M = 6.29$) than were those in the coworker-priming condition ($M = 3.44$), $F(1, 33) = 13.62, p = .001$ ($\eta^2p = 0.32$). Gender had no main effect on reported willingness but did interact with priming condition, $F(1, 33) = 4.88, p = .04$ (η^2p of interaction = .14), indicating that men were more willing to help in the friend-priming condition ($M = 7.11$) than were women ($M = 5.38$) and less willing to help in the coworker-priming condition ($M = 2.78$) than were women ($M = 4.29$).	the same article).			
23.	Bargh, J. A., Gollwitzer, P. M., Lee-Chai, A., Barndollar, K., & Trötschel, R. (2001). The automated will: Nonconscious activation and pursuit of behavioral goals. <i>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</i> , 81(6), 1014-1027. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.81.6.1014 (Experiment 1)	Participants completed a word-search puzzle which consisted of a 10x10 letter matrix with 13 words embedded in it. The high-performance condition word search-puzzle had 6 neutral words and 7 words relating to achievement, while the control condition only had neutral words. After completing this puzzle, participants completed 3 more word-search puzzles. These pertained to three different themes (bugs, foods and colors) and had 10 words embedded in each. The DV was the sum of words found in the last three puzzles. No participants suspected that words of the first puzzle were related to subsequent tasks. There was a main effect of prime on number of words found, $F(1, 74) = 9.64, p = .003$. High-performance-goal primed participants found a mean of 26.0 words, compared with a mean of 21.5 words for participants in the neutral priming condition.		The paper is classical, having been cited more than 1200 times. It qualifies as a prominent, high-profile study, and is one of the most cited articles in the social priming literature. It is simple to implement and there appear to be no direct replications using samples from the US or other countries.	Yes	
24.	Bem, D(2011). Feeling the future: experimental evidence for anomalous retroactive influences on cognition and affect. <i>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</i> , 100(3), 407-425. Study 2 (avoidance of negative stimuli) Study 4 (retro-priming)	Study 2 (15 minutes plus instructions): 100 participants was requested to seat in front of the computer and asked to respond to the two items on the stimulus seeking scale. This was followed by the same 3-min relaxation period. Then, on each of 36 trials, the participant was shown a low-arousal, affectively neutral picture and its mirror image side by side and asked to press one of two keys on the keyboard to indicate which neutral picture he or she liked better. Using the Araneus Alea I hardware-based RNG, the computer then randomly designated one of the two pictures to be the target. Note that the computer did not determine which of the two neutral pictures would be the target until after the participant had registered his or her preference. Whenever the participant had indicated a preference for the target-to-be, the computer flashed a positively valenced picture on the screen subliminally three times. Whenever the participant had indicated a preference for the nontarget, the computer subliminally flashed a highly arousing, negatively valenced picture. Pictures were again selected primarily from the IAPS set. The flashed pictures were exposed for 33 ms, followed immediately by a masking stimulus for 167 ms. Results: Hits rate = 51.7%; $t(149) = 2.39; d = 0.20$ Study 4 (retropriming) (15 minutes plus instructions): 100 participants were shown a picture on each of 64 trials and were asked to press		The Bem's paper is well known for the general outcry it generated after its publication. Apart the criticisms related to the statistical approach used, the main objections were addressed to the interpretation of the results, that is that future random events can be detected (unconsciously) and they can influence decisions apparently violating the asymmetry between cause and effect. We think that as it was done for another effect, Retroactive Facilitation of Recall reported in Bem's study, were multiple replications have been carried out (see Galak et al. 2012; Ritchie et al. 2012), it is worth to replicate the two above described phenomena. If the present proposal will be accepted we propose to replicate the two study with two procedural modification.	Yes	See results above

		<p>one of two keys on the keyboard as quickly as they could to indicate whether the picture was pleasant or unpleasant. The participant's response time in making this judgment was the dependent variable, and the difference in mean response times between incongruent and congruent trials is the index of a priming effect, with positive differences denoting faster responding on congruent trials. The first 32 trials constituted the retroactive priming procedure, and participants were told that a word would be flashed on the screen just after they made their judgment of the picture. The remaining 32 trials constituted the standard forward priming procedure, and participants were told that "from this point on, the flashed word will appear before rather than after you have made your response.</p> <p>Retropriming: $t(98)^* = 2.03$; $d=0.20$ $*=1$ outlier omitted</p>	<p>For Study 2, participants will be required to press both keys as soon as an image will be presented on the screen. This variation has been demonstrated more reliable by one of us (Maier) to avoid any bias in the choice of the two keys.</p> <p>For Study 4, only the retro-priming condition will be presented, reducing the time of the experiments.</p>		
25.	<p>Nisbett, R. E., & Bellows, N. (1977). Verbal reports about causal influences on social judgments: Private access versus public theories. <i>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</i>, 35(9), 613.</p>	<p>Participants read a hypothetical profile of a job applicant that did or did not include five different pieces of information (manipulated orthogonally). They rate the applicant on intelligence, sympathy and liking, and then report the extent to which the factors they were exposed to influenced their judgment. The key finding is that there was no correlation between how factors influenced participants and their rating of how factors influenced them (but see Smith and Miller, 1978).</p> <p>Note - Whether this counts as a study with two or fewer conditions depends on whether this criteria matters from a statistical analysis perspective (yes - there is one key correlation) or a web implementation perspective (no - there are many cells).</p> <p>Regardless, this study would need to be simplified somewhat, perhaps focusing only on the "global liking" dv (to meet the one dependent measure requirement) and reducing the "fully orthogonal" manipulation of information (32 combinations) to something more modest (e.g. each participants sees 2 of the 5 pieces of information, for 25 combinations).</p>	<p>This is one of the central studies that justifies the claim that people have no awareness of how contextual cues influence explicit judgment (Nisbett & Wilson, 77). While this may be true for moods and contextual cues that seem irrelevant to the target of judgment, in this case, the information provided is focal to the target of judgment and so this is somewhat surprising. Moreover, the finding of interest is a null effect, with an N of ~120 that used a debatable analytic strategy (Smith and Miller, 1978). A lot of later social cognition relies on this premise, although the data supporting it may not be so strong.</p>	Yes	<p>$r = -.3$, ns in the original analysis, $r = .24$, $p < .01$ (within subjects) in Eliot Smith's reanalysis.</p>
26.	<p>Salthouse, T.A. & Siedlecki, K.L. (2007). An individual differences analysis of false recognition. <i>American Journal of Psychology</i>, 120, 429-458.</p> <p>Experiment 1</p>	<p>Procedure: (Deese-Roediger-McDermott/DRM Paradigm). Individuals study 10 lists comprised of 15 words for 1 second each, with 2 seconds between lists. Then participants complete an Old/New recognition test, including 30 presented words, 10 critical items (items related to the lists, but not presented), and 40 new items (control). Researchers also collected Remember-Know judgments.</p> <p>Results: Individuals falsely recognize having seen a word that was never presented. Furthermore, participants phenomenological experience for true and false memories are similar, as evidence by Remember responses.</p> <p>Results reported in Table 2. of paper (Proportions) Hit Rate = .69, False Alarm Rate Critical Lure = .80, False Alarm to New Items = .19</p> <p>Remember-Know Judgments -- Similar Remember-Know Judgments for item types (Hit Rate Remember = .51; False Alarm Critical Lure Remember = .59)</p>	<p>The Roediger and McDermott (1995) article is highly cited. Their adaptation of the Deese study contributed to the generation of the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm that has been widely used to illicit illusory memories in a lab-based setting, including the selected study for consideration.</p> <p>Note 1: The Roediger and McDermott study included both recall and recognition, but I suggest the methodology of Siedlecki and Salthouse's study that only incorporated recognition for simplicity (i.e., not having to code recall responses).</p>	Yes	<p>A comparison on the mean False Alarm Critical Lure .80 (SD = .22) to mean Hit Rate .69 (SD = .17) results in a $d = .56$.</p>

			Note 2: I think a memory study can be included using JavaScript. If a person presses a response to move on to the next item before 1 second has elapsed, the item could remain on the screen.		
27.	Tversky, A., Kahneman, D., & Choice, R. (1981). The framing of decisions. <i>Science</i> , 211, 453-458. Problem 10	Study uses two vignettes to demonstrate mental accounting and framing effects - people are willing to travel 20 min to save \$5 on a \$15 purchase, but not \$5 on a \$120 purchase	This is a widely cited effect and has been replicated many times, suggesting it is robust. It may however, be sensitive to between sample characteristics including income.		68% of participants were willing to make an extra trip to save \$5 on a \$15 purchase. Only 29% were willing to make an extra trip to save \$5 on a \$125 purchase. N=88, no statistical test, but estimated Chi Sq = 13.14, p < .001
28.	Hsee, C. K. (1998). Less is better: When low-value options are valued more highly than high-value options. <i>Journal of Behavioral Decision Making</i> , 11(2), 107-121. (Study 3)	Participants are shown illustrated, hypothetical servings of ice cream from one or two potential vendors. "Respondents were assigned to either the separate evaluation or the joint evaluation version. Those in the separate evaluation versions were given information for only one of the servings and indicated their willingness-to-pay price. Those in the joint evaluation version learned about both servings and indicated their willingness-to-pay prices...there was a less-is-better effect as well as a preference reversal between separate and joint evaluation (see Exhibit 4): In separate evaluation, participants were willing to pay more for Vendor L's serving. In joint evaluation, they were willing to pay more for Vendor H's serving."	Notable number of citations (203 based on Google Scholar results), reasonable to implement, and provides interesting insight into JDM on a small-scale economic level. "...by showing that preferences are neither consistent nor stable; they are constructed ad hoc and depend heavily on whatever comparison information is available at the time of the evaluation."		
29.	Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. A. (2009). Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations. <i>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</i> , 96(5), 1029-46. (Study 2)	We aim to replicate study 2 which examined how explicit and implicit political identity affected moral judgment. Procedure: Participants will complete the moral relevance items, moral judgments items as well as the IAT of political identity in an order randomized for each participant. Results: political identity predicted moral relevance assessments in the predicted direction for Harm ($\beta=-.27$), Fairness ($\beta=-.36$), Ingroup ($\beta=.11$), Authority ($\beta=.39$), and Purity ($\beta=.38$), all $ps<.001$. Explicit political identity predicted moral judgments in the predicted direction for Harm ($\beta=-.32$), Fairness ($\beta=-.43$), Ingroup ($\beta=-.67$), Authority ($\beta=-.62$), and Purity ($\beta=-.57$), all $ps<.001$. Ratings for individualizing foundations were higher than ratings for the binding foundations for both relevance items, $F(1, 1205)=1,215.62$, $p<.001$, $\eta^2=.50$, and judgment items, $F(1, 1200)=635.58$, $p<.001$, $\eta^2=.35$, and this effect was moderated by politics for both relevance items, $F(1, 1205)=450.42$, $p<.001$, $\eta^2=.27$, and judgment items, $F(1, 1200)=649.40$, $p<.001$, $\eta^2=.35$, such that the more liberal participants showed the greatest differentiation.	This paper is well known not only because it had large impact in moral psychology literature (cited by 468 times) but also generated lots of controversies after its publication. Researchers showed how conservatives placed broader moral emphasis than do liberals, which balanced out the liberal bias/inclinations within the field of social psychology. We think it is an important study that worth to replicate for the following reasons: 1) The original study was done five years ago, a replication five years after would provide more convincing empirical evidence to prove the effects are robust over time; 2) The sample in the initial study was large but somewhat biased. We aim to collect data cross-culturally (balanced among liberals, moderates, and conservatives) as well as from both west and east cultures (e.g.	Yes	Please see the results above

			China) to further test its universality and boundaries conditions.		
30.	Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. <i>Science</i> (New York, N.Y.), 293(5537), 2105–8. doi:10.1126/science.1062872 (Experiment 2)	<p>Participants read 60 moral dilemmas to provide behavioral reaction time data concerning participants' moral judgments. The key finding is that responses of "appropriate" (emotionally incongruent) were significantly slower than responses of "inappropriate" (emotionally congruent) within the moral-personal condition, and there was no significant difference in reaction time between responses of "appropriate" and "inappropriate" in the other two conditions.</p> <p>This study would need to be simplified somewhat, perhaps focusing only on the differences between moral-personal and moral-impersonal conditions (to meet the two or fewer conditions requirement) and reducing half of the amount of the moral dilemmas.</p>	<p>This study is well-known not only with citation of 1911 times, it also reshapes the field of contemporary moral psychology. We think it's worth to replicate for the following reasons: 1) it provided both behavior data and brain evidence to explore the mechanisms of moral judgment, we will replicate the behavior data primarily; 2) It highlighted the role of emotion played in moral judgment which challenged the long-standing status of reasoning and inferences in dominant moral psychology; 3) Considering people cast doubt on the personal/impersonal distinction in explaining the differences between the two trolley moral dilemmas, the robustness of those effects need to be shown; 4) Cross-cultural samples (from both west and east cultures) are especially needed to validate the universal psychological mechanism of moral judgment.</p>	No	<p>Mean reaction time by condition and response type in Experiment 2. A mixed-effects ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between condition and response type [F(2, 8)=12.449, P<0.0005]. Reaction times differed significantly between responses of "appropriate" and "inappropriate" in the moral-personal condition [t(8)= 4.530, P<0.0005] but not in the other conditions (P>0.05).</p>
31.	Schwarz, N., Bless, H., Strack, F., Klumpp, G., Rittenauer-Schatka, H., & Simons, A. (1991). Ease of retrieval as information: Another look at the availability heuristic. <i>Journal of Personality and Social psychology</i> , 61(2), 195.	<p>Ss describe either 6 or 12 examples of very assertive (or very unassertive) behaviors they produced. Recalling 12 examples produced a lower self-assessment of assertiveness (or unassertiveness). Authors hypothesize that 12 examples are more difficult to retrieve than 6, and that people use the difficulty as a basis for trait attribution.</p>	Cited 751 times.	Yes	
32.	Shafir, E. (1993). Choosing versus rejecting: Why some options are both better and worse than others. <i>Memory & Cognition</i> , 21(4), 546-556. Problem 1	<p>Participants are presented with a vignette that describes two parents in a hypothetical custody battle. One parent (the enriched option) has a mix of positive and negative features, the other (impoverished option) is described in less detail. Participants were asked to either choose who should be awarded custody or who should be denied custody. The enriched option is more likely to be selected regardless of condition.</p>	<p>This paper has been cited around 400 times and replicated several times. It is a reasonable stable finding.</p>	Yes	Z = 2.49, p = .02
33.	Kay, A. C., Wheeler, S. C., Bargh, J. A., & Ross, L. (2004). Material priming: The influence of mundane physical objects on situational construal and competitive behavioral choice. <i>Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes</i> , 95(1), 83-96. Study	<p>In the original study, participants were asked to rank order a number of different pictures according to height. The pictures either did or did not contain business related content. Participants were then asked to indicate their response to a hypothetical prisoners dilemma framed as either the "Community Game" or the "Situation". They others observed an interaction between prime and frame, such that the business prime only influenced responses in the "community game" condition. Note that the basic effect documented in this paper (that business primes increase competitive behavior) can be implemented as a 2 cell design using only the "Situation" conditions</p>	<p>This is a social priming experiment that has been cited more than 240 times.</p>	Yes	<p>F(1,35) = 4.71, p = .04 which translates into t= 2.17, so d = 1.59</p>

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34.	Ross, L., Greene, D., & House, P. (1977). The "false consensus effect": An egocentric bias in social perception and attribution processes. <i>Journal of Experimental Social Psychology</i> , 13(3), 279-301.	Participants read four scenarios and indicated how they would act and the likelihood that others would act in the same way. The key finding is that people assume that others will behave the way that they do	This is a classic psychological study cited more than a thousand times that produces a large and robust effect. It also is a short study that is *not* from JDM so it may add to the diversity of effects examined.	Yes	$F(1,312) = 49.1$ $p < .001$ so $t = 7$, $d = .8$
35.	Buunk, B. P., Angleitner, A., Oubaid, V., & Buss, D. M. (1996). Sex differences in jealousy in evolutionary and cultural perspective: Tests from the Netherlands, Germany, and the United States. <i>Psychological Science</i> , 7(6), 359-363.	Participants rate the extent to which they would feel jealous if their partner engaged in sexual or emotional infidelity. The key finding is that women are more upset by emotional infidelity and men are more upset by sexual infidelity	This seems to be a robust finding. This paper obtains the effect in three large samples. It looks like there is considerable variation though - possibly related to values or gender norms. For example the effect is much smaller in the Netherlands than in the USA. If we collect this, we might want to think about what demographic information we would also like to collect for follow up analysis - possibly conservatism and sexual orientation.	Yes	$\gamma = .78$ (USA) $\gamma = .60$ (Germany) $\gamma = .46$ (Netherlands)
36.	Kross, E., Ayduk, O., & Mischel, W. (2005). When asking "why" does not hurt: Distinguishing rumination from reflective processing of negative emotions. <i>Psychological Science</i> , 16, 709-715. Study 2	Participants recalled a negative event in either a self-distanced or immersed perspective. The authors found that emotional reactivity was lower when thinking of a negative event from a self-distanced perspective. Note that there are also two covariates (emotional closeness and conflict status) that were included in the analysis.	This was nominated paper of the year by Science (in 2005) and this finding seems to resolve a major inconsistency in the prior literature. It has been cited over 200 times	Yes	$F(3, 119) = 4.75$, $p < .05$, $d = 0.46$.
37.	Oppenheimer, D. M., & Frank, M. C. (2008). A rose in any other font would not smell as sweet: Effects of perceptual fluency on categorization. <i>Cognition</i> , 106(3), 1178-1194. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.05.010 Study 2	"Participants were asked to rate on a scale of 1-9 (1 being least likely and 9 being most likely) the likelihood that any given member of a category had a given feature. For example, they were asked, "Imagine you come across a fish. What are the odds it has fins?" Six separate categories were listed, (fish, dog, bird, tree, pig, and cat), with five features varying in their typicality presented for each category (see Table 2). There were two between-subject conditions: a control condition and a lowered fluency condition. In the control condition, stimuli were presented in a normal, 12 point Arial font, while in the lowered fluency condition, stimuli were presented in italic Blackadder ITC font, printed in 50% gray color, halfway between black and white text colors (see Fig. 1). Again, lowered fluency stimuli were fully legible, but significantly degraded from those in the control condition." "Features in the lowered fluency condition were judged to be, on average, less likely for any given exemplar (mean control = 6.70, mean lowered fluency = 6.54). A comparison of exemplar means in each condition in a paired-sample t-test revealed this difference to be reliable ($t(29) = 2.13$, $p = 0.042$, Cohen's $d = .79$)." 40 cites in 6 years		Yes	$t(29) = 2.13$, $p = 0.042$, Cohen's $d = .79$
38.	Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. A. (2009). Liberals and conservatives rely on different	During registration, political self-identification was reported on a 7-point scale anchored by strongly liberal and strongly conservative, with moderate at the midpoint.	MFT has been very influential in social psychology and in the popular media	Yes	We tested whether the effects of political identity persisted after partialing

	<p>sets of moral foundations. <i>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</i>, 96(5), 1029–1046. doi:10.1037/a0015141</p> <p>Study 1</p>	<p>Participants first read “When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the following considerations relevant to your thinking?” They then rated 15 moral relevance items (see Appendix A) on 6-point scales anchored by the labels never relevant and always relevant. The items were written to be face-valid measures of concerns related to the five foundations, with the proviso that no item could have an obvious relationship to partisan politics. For example, a Fairness item stated “Whether or not someone was denied his or her rights.” By avoiding mention of specific “culture war” topics such as gun rights or gay rights, we minimized the extent to which participants would recognize the items as relevant to political ideology and therefore draw on knowledge of what liberals and conservatives believe to guide their own ratings. Cronbach’s alphas for the three-item measures of each foundation were .62 (Harm), .67 (Fairness), .59 (Ingroup), .39 (Authority), and .70 (Purity). (For information on the factor structure of the moral foundations, see the General Discussion below and refer to the supplement available at www.moralfoundations.org).</p> <p>A 16th item stated “Whether or not someone believed in astrology.” This item served as a check for whether participants paid attention, understood the scale, and responded meaningfully. We expected that high ratings of relevance on this item reflected careless or otherwise uninterpretable performance on the rest of the scale. Sixty-five participants (4.0%) were excluded because they used the upper half of the relevance scale in response to this item.</p>		<p>out variation in moral relevance ratings for other demographic variables. We created a model representing the five foundations as latent factors measured by three manifest variables each, simultaneously predicted by political identity and four covariates: age, gender, education level, and income. This model is shown in Figure 2; for clarity, we show the standardized regression estimates for politics only. Including the covariates, political identity still predicted all five foundations in the predicted direction, all $p < .001$. Political identity was the key explanatory variable: It was the only consistent significant predictor (average $\beta = .25$; range .16 to .34) for all five foundations.</p>
39.	<p>Luguri, J. B., Napier, J. L., & Dovidio, J. F. (2012). Reconstructing Intolerance: Abstract Thinking Reduces Conservatives' Prejudice Against Nonnormative Groups. <i>Psychological Science</i>, 23(7), 756–763. doi:10.1177/0956797611433877</p> <p>Study 1</p>	<p>we investigated whether individual differences in construal level (abstract vs. concrete), assessed with Vallacher and Wegner’s (1989) Behavioral Identification Form, were related to differences in prejudice toward nonnormative social groups. We measured feelings toward different social groups using feeling thermometers, which have been shown to be reliable and precise measures of feelings toward various groups (Alwin, 1997). Our focus was on participants’ feelings toward four nonnormative groups (gay men, lesbians, Muslims, and atheists), but we also assessed feelings toward racial-ethnic minority groups (Blacks, Latinos) and dominant groups (Whites, Christians). We predicted that more politically conservative participants would display more negative feelings toward the nonnormative groups, which would be in line with results from prior research (Nosek, Banaji, & Jost, 2009), but that this effect would be moderated by individual differences in construal level. Specifically, we expected that conservatives would have less negative feelings toward nonnormative groups if they characteristically adopted a more abstract mindset. We expected that mindset would not be associated with feelings toward racial-ethnic minority groups (because they are legally guaranteed equal rights and because the American Creed is more commonly perceived to apply to them than to nonnormative groups) or toward dominant groups. Because liberals tend to support equal rights for nonnormative groups and thus should not experience a conflict between their</p>	<p>Stereotyping is of broad interest in social psychology and to the general public</p>	<p>Yes</p>

		abstract values and their feelings toward these groups, we did not expect mind-set to be related to their responses			
40.	Szymkow, A., Chandler, J., IJzerman, H., Parzuchowski, M., & Wojciszke, B. (2013). Warmer Hearts, Warmer Rooms. <i>Social Psychology</i> , 44(2), 167-176.	<p>Undergraduate students (n = 80; 50 women; Mage = 23.48, SD = 4.56) from the Sopot Campus of the Warsaw School of Social Sciences and Humanities, Poland, were recruited for experimental sessions.</p> <p>Participants were randomly assigned to consider one of four different sets of 8 traits that reflected positive agentic (e.g., "intelligent," "efficient"), negative agentic (e.g., "foolish," "lazy"), positive communal (e.g., "honest," "friendly"), or negative communal qualities (e.g., "rude," "unfriendly," Abele & Wojciszke, 2007). For the Many Labs project, I propose this can be modified to two conditions, positive and negative communal. Participants were told that everyone has both good and bad qualities, and that it is beneficial to be aware of these. They were instructed to read the list carefully, imagine situations and behaviors that represent each trait in everyday life, and select four traits that were most characteristic of them. After completing this task, under the guise of feedback for the recent school renovation, participants were asked to estimate the current room temperature.</p> <p>Participants in the positive communal traits group estimated a higher temperature than participants in the negative communal traits group.</p>	May count as social priming, new study with relatively unknown replicability.	Yes	Temperature perception differed between participants who focused on positive communal traits (M = 23.25, SD = 1.62) and negative communal traits (M = 17.98, SD = 2.27), $F(1, 79) = 32.65$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .29$ for the simple effect.
41.	Uskul, A. K., Oyserman, D., Schwarz, N., Lee, S. W., & Xu, A. J. (in press) How successful you have been in life depends on the response scale used. In <i>Press at Social Cognition</i> .	<p>"Participants were undergraduates in the U.S. (n = 56 European American, 33 women, Mage= 19.9, SD = .97), Turkey (n = 40, 36 women, Mage= 22.6, SD = 2.00) and Hong Kong (n = 43, 7 women, Mage= 20.6, SD = 1.58)."</p> <p>"In each sample, participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions which differed in the response scale provided (bipolar -5 to +5, or unipolar 0 to 10) and all responded to the same single question "How successful have you been in life?" in their native language. Verbal scale anchors were the same in both conditions. Not at all successful was the low anchor (to -5 in the bipolar condition and to 0 in the unipolar condition) and very successful was the high anchor (to +5 in the bipolar condition and to 10 in the unipolar condition)."</p>	Extremely short study, original finding demonstrates cross-cultural variation in effect size.	Yes	Several effects to be considered. "As predicted, analysis of variance yielded a cultural group main effect ($F(2, 133) = 18.21$, $p < .001$), a scale main effect ($F(1, 133) = 4.22$, $p = .04$), and a country by scale interaction ($F(2, 133) = 2.65$, $p = .07$, $\eta^2 = .038$, observed power = .52. With regard to cultural group main effect, as predicted, Chinese participants rated their own success more modestly (M = 5.79, SD = 1.85) than either Turkish (M = 7.48, SD = 1.13, $d = 1.10$) or American participants (M = 7.38, SD = 1.50, $d = .94$), ($ps < .001$) and Turkish and American participants did not differ from each other ($p = .86$). Across countries, ratings were higher on the bipolar

					(M = 7.16, SD = 2.02) than on unipolar (M = 6.63, SD = 1.29, d = .31) scale. As predicted, the effect of scale condition differed by country. Chinese participants maintained their modest response regardless of condition (unipolar M = 5.95, SD = 1.47; bipolar M = 5.64, SD = 2.17, p = .49). Turkish and American participants responded more positively on the bipolar (Turkish M = 8.00, SD = 1.03; American M = 7.84, SD = 1.75) than on the unipolar (Turkish M = 6.95, SD = 1.00, American M = 7.00, SD = 1.15) scale, both ps < .05, dTR = 1.03, dUS = .57."
42.	Kitayama, S., Duffy, S., Kawamura, T., & Larsen, J.T. (2003). Perceiving an object and its context in different cultures: A cultural look at the New Look. <i>Psychological Science</i> , 14, 201–206.	On each trial, participants were presented with a square frame, within which was printed a vertical line. Participants were then shown another square frame of the same or different size and asked to draw a line that was identical to the first line in either absolute length (absolute task) or proportion to the height of the surrounding frame (relative task). The results supported the hypothesis: Whereas Japanese were more accurate in the relative task, Americans were more accurate in the absolute task. Moreover, when engaging in another culture, individuals tended to show the cognitive characteristic common in the host culture.'			
43.	Gray, K., & Wegner, D. M. (2009). Moral typecasting: divergent perceptions of moral agents and moral patients. <i>Journal of personality and social psychology</i> , 96(3), 505. (study 6)	In this study, we presented participants with a description and a picture of a neutral target and, between subjects, placed it alongside the picture and description of either a moral agent (a red cross pilot) or a moral patient (an orphan). Participants read a scenario involving terrorists boarding a train, and rated how much torture each of the presented targets could withstand, and how responsible each target would be if a revolt started. The neutral target, David, was seen to be significantly more agentic when paired with the orphan (M 2.46) than when paired with the red cross pilot (M 2.07), $F(1, 74) = 4.34, p < .05, \eta^2 = .04$. As well, the neutral target David was seen to be more sensitive to pain when paired with the red cross pilot (M 2.07) than when paired with the orphan (M 1.54), $F(1, 74) = 17.10, p < .001, \eta^2 = .19$.	May add diversity to the selection of effects and is relatively quick, cited 80 times	Yes	
44.	Weaver, K., Garcia, S. M., & Schwarz, N. (2012). The presenter's paradox. <i>Journal of Consumer Research</i> , 39(3), 445-460. (Study 1)	There was another between-subjects condition, but I suggest focusing on the "consumer" condition. Participants read, "Imagine you are looking to buy a gift for a friend and you are considering purchasing an iPod Touch. In the store you see the following iPod package for sale". Half the participants then saw the 8-megabyte iPod Touch and cover package, while half saw the same package with the addition of a free mp3 download. All participants were asked, "Please estimate	Widespread and practical implications for consumer marketing, very quick study.	Yes	

		<p>how much you would be willing to pay for this gift in the space below.”</p> <p>They were willing to pay more for the smaller package that contained only the iPod (M = \$242.19, SD = \$108.41) than for the larger and economically more valuable package that contained the same iPod plus a free music download (M = \$176.71, SD = \$86.16; $F(1, 40) = 4.7, p < .05$).</p>			
45.	<p>Risen, J. L., & Gilovich, T. (2008). Why people are reluctant to tempt fate. <i>Journal of personality and social psychology, 95</i>(2), 293.(Study 1)</p>	<p>Participants read a scenario in which Jon recently finished applying to graduate school and that Stanford was his top choice. The scenario specified that, typical of Jon’s mother’s optimistic nature, she sent him a Stanford T-shirt in the mail. Participants read either that Jon decided to stuff the shirt in the bottom of the drawer while awaiting Stanford’s decision or that he decided to wear the shirt the next day. Participants were then asked to indicate how likely they believed it was that Stanford would offer Jon acceptance by circling a number between 0 and 10, with 0 labeled not at all likely and 10 labeled extremely likely</p> <p>As predicted, participants believed that Jon was less likely to be accepted to Stanford if he tempted fate by wearing the Stanford T-shirt (M 5.19, SD 1.35) than if he stuffed it in the drawer (M 6.13, SD 1.02), $t(60) 3.01, p .01, d 0.78$</p>	<p>Cited by 45, quick study of likely widespread phenomenon (but one that may vary by culture and belief in "fate")</p>	Yes	
46.	<p>Risen, J. L., & Gilovich, T. (2007). Another look at why people are reluctant to exchange lottery tickets. <i>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93</i>(1), 12.(Study 1)</p>	<p>In the one pertinent questionnaire, participants were asked to Imagine that they were entered in a 100-person lottery with a \$500 prize and that the following proposition was offered to them: “You can give up your lottery number in exchange for another randomly selected number plus a cash gift of \$10.” Participants were then asked to rely on their “gut feelings” and to indicate which of three possibilities was most likely to occur if they were to give up their number:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Making the trade would make my old number more likely to win. 2. Making the trade would not result in my old number becoming either more or less likely to win. 3. Making the trade would make my old number less likely to win. <p>The thought of turning in a lottery ticket elicits a gut feeling in many people that exchanging the ticket would make it more likely to win. Of these 48 participants, 22 (46%) indicated that their number would be more likely to win if they made the trade, 2 (4%) indicated that their number would be less likely to win, and 24 (50%) indicated that making the trade would not change the likelihood of the number winning.</p> <p>A chi-square test supported the prediction that participants would not endorse each of the three possibilities equally, $\chi^2(2, N = 48) 18.5, p < .001$</p>	<p>Cited by 50, very quick</p>	Yes	
47.	<p>Rottenstreich, Y., & Hsee, C. K. (2001). Money, kisses, and electric shocks: On the affective psychology of risk. <i>Psychological Science, 12</i>(3), 185-190. (study 1)</p>	<p>Forty Rice University undergraduates completed a short Questionnaire included in a packet of unrelated questionnaires. The study consisted of two between-subjects probability conditions: certainty and low probability. Participants in the certainty condition were asked to imagine that they could receive either “the opportunity to meet and kiss your favorite movie star” or \$50 in cash. These participants indicated which of the two prizes they preferred. Participants in the low-probability condition (n</p>	<p>Popular and well-cited JDM paper (400+ citations), quick to administer and a quite direct replication would be easy.</p>		

		<p>5 20) were asked to imagine that they could take part in either a lottery offering a 1% chance of winning “the opportunity to meet and kiss your favorite movie star” or a lottery offering a 1% chance of winning \$50 in cash. These participants indicated which lottery they preferred to play.</p> <p>In the certainty condition, 70% of participants preferred the cash over the kiss, but in the low-probability condition, 65% of participants preferred the kiss lottery over the cash lottery.</p>			
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