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Abstract

Recent findings of low societal consensus in cultural values suggest that our field's dominant paradigm—culture as shared values—is a fallacy. The perennial persistence of this illusion may come from that it appeals to the human brain's hardwired capacity for essentialism. Evidence against value consensus, however, does not doom all shared-meaning models of culture (pace Schwartz, 2013). I describe evidence for other kinds of mental representations (i.e., concepts, beliefs, norms) that are shared (in the sense of consensus, contagion, or conjoint control) and underlie culturally patterned behavior. Also I consider and probe Schwartz's (2013) proposed definition of culture as a society-level value system, raising questions about its ontology, functionalism and explanatory power, particularly with regard to understanding cultural change. While acknowledging the utility of aggregated value scores for many research programs, I conclude that psychology needs to study individual-level cultural representations and within-society variation in order to understand the dynamics of cultural influence and change.

Keywords

essentialism, values, norms, individual level of analysis, cultural change

In popular discourse, “culture” is a vague and all-encompassing force that can be invoked to explain any of person's or group's behaviors or failings. As scientists we aim to build more precise models that avoid the fallacies of stereotypes and other intuitive biases about societal differences. Yet when we tighten our definitions of culture, we must always consider whether narrowing definitions will also narrow the questions that we can address.

This essay responds to Schwartz's (2013) critique of shared-meaning models of culture and his updated theoretical justification for operationalizing culture with aggregated country-level scores from ratings of abstract values. Recent analyses have revealed that such value ratings are not highly consensual within nations, nor highly different across nations. Schwartz (2013) takes these results to have “shaken the confidence of psychology researchers in the prevailing conception of societal culture” (p. 3). Instead of the prevalent conception of culture as the values that a society's members share, Schwartz defines culture as a system of meaning that exists “external to the individual” (p. 5). On this basis, he provides a new rationalization of the methodological approach of operationalizing culture in terms of aggregated country-level value scores, an

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analogy to measuring aptitudes such as IQ. Just as aptitudes are latent constructs estimated by aggregating across highly variable items, country-level values are latent constructs estimated by aggregating across many variable individuals. To reconcile this approach with high within-country variance, Schwartz (2013) adjusts some of his prior assumptions about culture and its paths of influence on behavior.

Schwartz's (2004, 2006) prior research on country-level value scores has yielded unique insights into how ideologies and institutions constrain individual attitudes and behavior. Its clarity and parsimony makes it a foundation on which many other cross-cultural researchers build. Appreciating this accomplishment, I argue that Schwartz's (2013) challenge to prevailing conceptions may help the field overcome its persistent illusion of value consensus. At the same time, I submit that his categorical rejection of shared-meaning accounts goes too far. I describe several types of shared-meaning accounts which are not based on abstract value prioritizations and lack the same essentialistic assumptions. Next I evaluate Schwartz's (2013) proposed model of culture as an integrated value system at the society level and question its ontology, functionalism and explanatory range. While it succeeds in reconciling the country-scores method with the finding of high within-country variance, it results in narrow concept of culture. Without studying how culture is represented within the individual, we cannot address many of the important questions about culture and psychology.

Essentialist Intuitions

Progress in any science requires willingness to rethink fundamental concepts, even concepts that feel intuitively correct. Sciences tend to begin with everyday folk concepts, the products of intuition. These can serve well for a while but eventually impede progress on some questions. For instance, classical biology conceptualized species as distinctive kinds, nonoverlapping categories of members marked by distinctive traits. This concept worked well for assembling Linnean taxonomies, but it obscured the topic of how species change. Only after Darwin's observations spurred a redefinition of species in terms of descent rather than resemblance did biology begin to understand the dynamics of evolution. The classical notion of species as timeless natural kinds appeals to an intuitive way of thinking called essentialism, which involves assuming that all a category's members share an underlying essence that produces its distinctive traits.

Likewise, classical understandings of culture—how Greeks differed from Persians, or Romans from Jews—held these peoples to be distinct kinds, defined by something in the “blood” that makes them act in their characteristic ways. Roman blood or Jewish blood was an unobservable quality shared by all the members of a group that could be flexibly imputed to explain the full range of its distinctive behaviors. Essentialistic conceptions of membership in communities have persisted into the modern era, encoded in institutions such as *jus sanguinis* standards for German citizenship, the “one drop rule” for racial classification in the US, caste-related marriage customs in India, and so forth. A widespread goal of anthropological, cross-cultural, and cultural psychology research is to supplant essentialist folk theories with the understanding that cultural characteristics reflect socially inherited information. By moving beyond essentialist concepts, cultural sciences can better appreciate heterogeneity within groups (rather than stereotyping them) and appreciate how traditions evolve (rather than hypostatizing them).

But it is not easy for a science to entirely escape intuitive concepts. Developmental psychology finds that even toddlers spontaneously draw essentialist inferences about animal species and ethnic groups (Gelman, 2003; Hirschfeld, 1996). Essentialism seems to be hardwired into the human brain to facilitate rapid acquisition of natural kind categories.

The perennial recurrence of shared-value models of culture may reflect that they fit the same essentialist template as shared-blood models, as values are an inner quality that can be imputed to the members of a community to explain all of its distinctive behaviors. Examples include

World War II-era accounts of national character (Benedict, 1946), sociological frameworks of distinctive value patterns (Parsons & Shils, 1951), and cross-cultural research unpacking country effects in terms of individual differences in values (Bond, 1996; Triandis, 1995; Trompenaars, 1993). Each of these shared-value models, in its time, was critiqued for underplaying within-country variation (Minami, 1950; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Wrong, 1961), yet the paradigm returned in a new form.

Schwartz's (2013) critique flows from a more systematic investigation of how values vary. Fischer and Schwartz (2011) examined multicountry data sets with three instruments measuring priorities among abstract values: the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS), the Portrait Value Survey (PVS), and the World Value Survey (WVS), finding that country accounted for only 12%, 2%, and 22%, respectively, of the variance. The degree of within-country consensus was, respectively, moderate, moderate, and low (though highly variable across items). Overall, individuals' value ratings vary more within countries than across countries. Relatedly, much evidence weighs against accounts that individuals' cultural values drive their culturally characteristic behaviors (e.g. Morris & Leung, 2000; Weber & Morris, 2010).

Why then the perennial popularity of value consensus models—to scientists as well as to managers, educators and other people who deal with cultural differences? My thesis is that value/character consensus models appeal to human brain's intuitive essentialism. Like traditional notions of "blood," a value orientation is an inner attribute that can linked to all of a culture's distinctive behaviors. A model that is so intuitively appealing may persist despite disconfirming evidence. I hope that Schwartz's critique will help to liberate cultural research from the persistent illusions of value consensus and value-expression models.

Qualifying the Critique

While Schwartz's (2013) critique of value-consensus models is invaluable, his sweeping dismissal of shared-meaning models goes beyond the data. Values are not the only means toward meaning. Shared meaning is axiomatic in many theories of human culture. That is, humans can communicate and collaborate with ingroup others because shared mental representations create a common ground of meaning. Fischer and Schwartz (2011) concluded more moderately that "most values are not part of the shared meaning systems that many presume to constitute culture" (p. 1137). Schwartz (2013) takes the argument further by claiming that these findings "pose a serious challenge to theories that view cultures as shared meaning systems" (p. 3). He rejects the idea that culture is carried by an individual's mental representations and concludes that culture is "external to individuals" (p. 5). But this goes beyond what Fischer and Schwartz's findings imply to reject a whole category of models.

There are many types of relevant meaning or knowledge other than abstract value commitments. In addition, there are many kinds of sharing other than country-wide consensus. To illustrate, I will describe some types of representations that afford meaning, giving rise to cultural patterns, and then I will describe various ways in which such representations are shared.

Types of Meaning

A basic source of shared meaning in societal cultures is the stock of concepts imparted through language and everyday practices. What distinguishes *homo sapiens* from other species is not so much our intelligence as our knowledge, the vast legacy of declarative knowledge and procedural knowledge that each generation inherits from previous generations. Cognitive anthropologists study categories, taxonomies and semantic networks that underlie characteristic behavior of people in different communities (D'Andrade, 2001). [Even research on abstract values shows evidence for shared concepts, as people's understanding of value concepts is

highly shared, even though their prioritization of values is not (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987). Granted, the structure of value concepts would not be useful for differentiating societal cultures, as it is shared across cultures as well. Yet this should not exclude such concepts from our definition of culture. To understand the role of culture in psychology, we need to focus on all of it, not just the parts that differ most across societies. If we reduce culture to cultural differences, we will miss many important cultural contents. Culturally transmitted concepts that are common across traditions may play particularly important roles in human psychology and social life (see Baumeister, 2005).]

Social axioms are representations that people hold about society. Leung, Bond, and colleagues have identified dimensions of social axioms, general beliefs about the social environment that account for many country differences not explained by values (Bond, Leung, Au, Tong, & Chemonges-Nielson, 2004; Leung et al., 2002). These beliefs about how the world works are an important source of shared meaning.

Similarly, assumptions or perceptions of social norms are particularly important carriers of culture (Morris, Hong, & Chiu, 2013). Prescriptive norms represent what is appropriate or approved of in a given situation. Norm-compliant behavior is elicited when people think about authority figures, even when those others are not present to enforce the norm (Savani, Morris & Naidu, 2012). Some kinds of behavior are not only moralized but sacralized as absolute principles. Research on sacred values or sacred norms (e.g., Atran, 2010; Atran, Axelrod, & Davis, 2007; Atran & Ginges, 2012) differs from the Schwartz tradition of cultural value research in its focus on more contextualized beliefs about appropriate behavior. More contextualized representations may tend to be higher in societal consensuality and distinctiveness. When it comes to religious representations, for instance, endorsements of abstract values (spiritual life, devout, respect for tradition) likely vary less across countries than endorsements of more contextualized ideas associated with specific religions (e.g., ancestor worship, *jihad*, reincarnation, Zionism).¹ Of course, the abstract items work better for *etic* scales and multicountry comparisons, but these methodological requirements of particular research designs should not narrow our theory of culture to solely that which fits.

Descriptive norms are mere regularities of ingroup behavior, beliefs and preferences, without moral overtones. Kuran (1995) argued that perceptions of peer beliefs are often mistaken, because people's outer behaviors often hide or falsify their private preferences. He showed that Indians' support for caste-based hiring in India was predicted not just by their own caste values but also by their perceptions that their fellow Indians held caste values. Wan and colleagues (2007) found that U.S. and Hong Kong samples differ less in their personal values than in their perceptions of their typical peers values. Hirai (2000) found that Japanese students impute collectivistic values to "the Japanese" but not to "myself." Yamagishi, Hashimoto, and Schug (2008) found that the Japanese bias to decline unique choice options does not reflect conformist values, but rather their expectations that their peers would sanction them for selfishness. Fischer et al. (2009) developed an instrument measuring the perceived collectivism of "most people" and found that, among New Zealanders, the perceived norm of collectivism predicted self-reported helping behaviors above and beyond their personal collectivism values. Shteynberg, Gelfand, and Kim (2009) found that U.S./Korean differences in blame assignment are not driven by differences in participants' personal commitment to collectivism (i.e., I will sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of the group) but by differences in perceived ingroup collectivism (Most Koreans <Americans> will sacrifice their self-interest for the benefit of the group). Zou et al. (2009) investigated country differences in influence, attribution, and counterfactual judgments, finding that country differences did not track inner values/beliefs but instead perceived ingroup norms. In their final experiment, bicultural Hong Kong students, who held expectations about both Chinese and Western norms, anchored their judgments on perceived Chinese norms when addressing a Chinese audience and anchored judgments on perceived Western beliefs when addressing a

Western audience. This suggests that perceived descriptive norms help people coordinate and communicate with other members of the culture.

Models of shared representations such as concepts, beliefs and norms escape the essentialism of shared-value models in several respects. First, these models do not posit a unitary construct at the bottom of all a culture's characteristics. [Admittedly, this means the models achieve less parsimony than value models.] Second, these accounts portray a society's characteristic behaviors as arising from the glue between people rather than from each person's inner core. For example, when people conform to a perceived norm, following what they assume "everyone else is doing," their actions are not the expression of inner values or character.

Anti-essentialist models of cultural characteristics can be illustrated with a metaphor. Picture a spider's web shining with early morning dew. Every mirrory drop of dew catches the reflection of myriad neighboring drops (and, in each of these reflected drops, the reflection of itself, and so on and so on). Every drop—each node in this network—shines brightly. Yet this silvery glow arises from surfaces, not essence—from recursive reflections, not inner light.

Types of Sharedness

Societal consensus is the meaning of sharedness that Schwartz targets in his critique. Are any of the aforementioned types of meaning "shared" by this standard? Some of them would seem to be. Cognitive anthropologists have found that conceptual domains that are shared with a high consensus within societies. For example, Americans understand their culture's kinship concepts (e.g. mother, uncle, nephew) with a nearly perfect consensus (Romney, Boyd, Moore, Batchelder, & Brazill, 1996).

What about perceived norms? Is there a consensus in views of the ingroup norms? On one hand, even individuals who are themselves outliers in their society can nevertheless perceive the norm. A professor in Hong Kong may value debate but nonetheless know that most of his neighbors prefer harmony. Tight versus loose cultures differ in norm adherence and perhaps in the consensuality of norm perceptions as well (Gelfand et al., 2011). More consensus would be expected in domains worked on by societies' ideology shaping institutions, such as compulsory education, military service, and state-funded media (Anderson, 1983). On the other hand, dissensus in perceptions of the ingroup norm can arise from differing experiences. One's perception of "the typical American" is in large part constructed from idiosyncratic experiences; perceptions of the ingroup norm depend on the perceiver's social network (O'Gorman, 1979) and exposure to salient outgroups (Turner, 1985). Empirical evidence about the consensuality of norm perceptions is mixed. Wan and colleagues (2007) found evidence that people's perceptions of their society's core values constitute an "intersubjective consensus." Fischer (2012) analyzed a multi-country sample of perceived ingroup norm ratings of SVS items, finding low consensus within countries, yet he also calculated consensus for Shteynberg et al.'s (2009) items and found much higher consensus. This may reflect that Shteynberg's items are more concrete and contextualized, which meant that perceiving their normativity required less of a constructed judgment and hence varied less.

Another definition of "shared" comes in theories of culture as contagion. In this paradigm, the sharing of ideas and behaviors is imperfect within a country and spreads like disease through social networks (Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Sperber, 1985). Atran, Medin, and Ross (2005) studied the animal and plant categories of people in Native American versus European-descent communities and found that conceptual structures differ by community and also as a function of social networks. Population-level models describe the diffusion of practices through societies over time (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). Other cultural psychologists emphasize that no one individual in a culture adopts all of its values or practices. Cultural ideals can be pursued in different ways (Kitayama, Park, Sevincer, Karasawa, & Uskul, 2009). Some ideas and practices

are reserved for certain subtypes of society, such as priests, women, elders, and so forth. These views imply that cultural representations will be shared but not in a society-wide consensus.

Finally, “shared” can also mean conjointly owned or controlled (Shore, 1996). If my neighbor and I share a file on dropbox.com, then his modifications to the file affect the copy of the file on my computer. In a similar way, cultural representations are not entirely owned by any single person. My perception of the ingroup norm is not entirely under my control; as my neighbor’s behavior shifts, my representation of the ingroup norm shifts along with it. Perceived ingroup norms involve this form of shared ownership, whereas personal values do not.

My point here is not to defend one kind of sharing as the correct one, but merely to argue that meaning is shared within cultures in several ways that are worthy of investigation.

Probing the Proposal

Schwartz’s (2013) positive agenda is reconciling the use of aggregated value scores with the high within-country variance in individual ratings. Schwartz’s model of country-level value orientations is one of the most influential rubrics in cross-cultural psychology, and it stands to become more influential as the field shifts from using country scores in limited ecological correlations to richer multilevel models (Bond & Muethel, 2012). In the process of rationalizing aggregated scores as latent attributes of societies, Schwartz narrows some of the definitions and assumptions in his framework of culture as country-level values. The theoretical reconciliation is convincing, but some questions can be raised about the limits of the assumptions made along the way.

More categorically than before, Schwartz (2013) asserts that culture exists on a separate ontological plane—apart from minds, artifacts, and institutions. He defines culture as an integrated value system that carries the distinctive character of the society.² Cultural researchers generally assume that the ideas in a society’s tradition exist in public forms as well as private thoughts (Sperber, 1985). However, public representations are tangible artifacts such as textbooks, advertisements, and legal codes (Morling & Lamoreaux, 2008). Schwartz regards artifacts and institutions as distorted byproducts of the culture rather than parts of the culture itself:

We might be able to infer the culture from the characteristics or products of its institutions (e.g., children’s books, constitutions, lyrics of popular music). However, each institution emphasizes a modified version of the overall latent culture because it has different functions. For example, hierarchy values are especially important in armies, autonomy values in universities, embeddedness values in families, and egalitarianism values in legal systems. (p. 8)

But what kind of entity, then, is a latent society-level value system? When we estimate a latent individual aptitude, such as IQ, we cannot directly point to the mechanism involved but we know that it is some pattern of brain functioning—were a person’s brain crushed in an accident, his or her latent aptitude would decline. What kind of mechanism is a cultural value system that is not constituted by individuals, artifacts or institutions? Past theories of culture as a *sui generis* super-organism (Kroeber, 1923) or an intangible Volksgeist (Herder, 1966) proved hard to test. Does cultural research benefit from positing culture as a latent entity—a ghost in the societal machine—rather than assuming that culture exists in a distributed form within people and institutions? Is imputing latent values to societies another vestige of cultural essentialism, tracing a society’s characteristics to one underlying source?

Schwartz’s (2013) reformulation of his model also makes more restrictive assumptions about the top-down influence processes through which culture constrains behavior. The latent cultural value system—the conative nucleus of the nation—exerts a uniform constraining force on all its institutions: legal, political, economic, family, educational, and so forth. These institutions then influence individuals’ thoughts and behavior. In this revised framework, cultural values do not

mediate the effects of social institutions on behavior. Perhaps Schwartz sees the high variance of personal values as incompatible with values playing such mediating roles. Regardless, the change is surprising, given that mediating effect of values was a major theme in Schwartz's (2006) past summaries of this research program.³ In sum, Schwartz (2013) has restricted his assumptions about values in ways that may make it hard to account for some of his past empirical findings. It may also limit our insights about cultural change. The effects of institutions such as capitalism or class structures depend on the cognitive lenses through which individuals interpret them, when legitimizing myths are challenged acceptance can turn into activism (Martorana, Galinsky & Rao, 2005).

Further questions can be raised about Schwartz's more longstanding functionalist premise that there is pressure for integration among a society's value systems and institutions: "Because prevailing cultural value orientations represent ideals, aspects of culture that are incompatible with them are likely to generate tension and to elicit criticism and pressure to change" (2006, p. 139). But many societies comprise disparate values and institutions arising from complex histories and thrive in spite of (or perhaps even because of) these inner contradictions or incompatibilities. In Hong Kong, for instance, individualistic British legal structures coexist with Confucian family structures. While some configurations of values may be more prevalent than others across the world's nations, this does not necessarily imply that these result reflect compatible values; they may be the outcomes of historical trajectories that many nations share. Marxist theories in sociology hold that all societies involve conflicts, conflicts that can be wellsprings of innovation and change (Dahrendorf, 1959). Conflicts within societies are not hard to spot when one looks beyond abstract values to institutions. The United States prizes liberty above all but incarcerates much of its population. Brazil is committed to conservative Catholicism yet also to carnal carnivals.

Functionalism led classical anthropologists to hypostatized readings of behavior in contemporary colonized societies as portraits of timeless ethnic character. Similarly, faith in homeostatic integration led Parsonsian sociologists to overlook the dramatic social and cultural changes budding on the campuses around them. If past is prologue, functionalism will direct research attention to cultural coherence rather than conflict and, ultimately, to cultural stasis rather than change.

Conclusions

In this essay, I've defended the view that culture consists of shared meaning, specifically that a society's culture includes ideas represented in the minds of its people, enacted in their practices, and inscribed in its institutions and artifacts. This paradigm is not threatened by findings that ratings of abstract values show low consensus and small country differences. At the same time, I have questioned Schwartz's (2013) model of culture as a latent society-level value system. While admirably parsimonious and clear, his proposal that a society's values exist in an integrated system on suprahuman plane involves ontological and functionalist assumptions that limit the questions that can be addressed, so it will not serve well for many psychological research programs related to culture and hence does not work for the field generally.

That said, the empirical utility of aggregated country-level value scores as proxies for capturing cultural influences on people is undeniable. Can the use of this method be justified without positing that values operate as a suprahuman functionalist system? I submit that aggregate value scores may predict behavior well because they tap several distinct mechanisms that influence an individual's behavior: the individual's actual values, the actual values of the person's peers and interactants, the person's perceptions of his or her group's descriptive and prescriptive norms, the values encoded in artifacts that prime behavior and institutions that reinforce behavior, and so forth. Most of these involve the actor being influenced by other people or perceptions of them (norms) rather than the actor expressing his or her own values. While all of these mechanisms could be measured independently, an aggregate of individual value ratings may provide a

summary indicator of the extent to which these various causal forces on behavior will be pushing in a given direction.

While values seem to be the form of mental representation most associated with behavior, this reflects in part that people rationalize their behavior in terms of values, even when it is caused otherwise. Consider the practice of footbinding in China. It is thought to have originated with a favored dancer in an imperial court, imitated by her peers and ultimately imposed by courtiers on their daughters, and then by others who sought to be associated with them. The practice spread to families outside of court and in other provinces, it persisted as widespread entrenched practice for centuries, and then it disappeared within a single generation (Mackie, 1996). In its heyday, this practice was rationalized in terms of central Chinese values, such as chastity and aestheticism; however, these values were present before its emergence and after its disappearance. What better explains its spread, persistence and then disappearance are norm dynamics such as imitating prestigious others, imitating the majority and institutionalization (Mackie, 1996). Similarly, in the 20th-century China, Confucian values were used to rationalize communist institutions in the 1940s and then to rationalize capitalist institutions in the 1990s. So the influence of values can be indirect, as rationalizations that reinforce behavior. Also values can be appropriated and attached to particular practices by authorities or by activists to influence others.

Rich scientific frameworks for understanding cultural influence and cultural change are crucially important in part because intuitive understandings about group differences are so hopelessly flawed. Essentialist intuitions lead people to stereotype nationalities and ethnicities that are actually quite heterogeneous, underappreciating the diversity of how different individuals make use of a common legacy, and to hypostatize cultural traditions, projecting the present into the past and future rather than recognizing cultural evolution. Schwartz (2006) argues that country-level value orientations change very slowly, persisting across centuries. If longitudinal data from abstract value ratings support this (we'll have to wait 100 years to know), it would not necessarily imply that cultures are unchanging but only that this component of culture is relatively stable. Other components of culture may be much more dynamic.

Ultimately cultural science must explain both cultural persistence and change. A challenge is to reconcile the stability of some cultural values with the flux of individual-level adherence to cultural norms (Weber & Morris, 2010) and the constant evolution of the institutions through which people coordinate their behavior (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). Consider the rapid evolution in attitudes toward and institutionalization of gay marriage. Attitudes can be predicted by contact with gays and the contents of social networks (Merino, 2013). To understand the processes of cultural change, we need to focus on within-country variation in cultural values and beliefs and on the normative dynamics (like conformity tipping points) through which people's behavior are affected by peer behavior and by what they perceive or imagine that peers believe and prefer.

In sum, psychology requires an inclusive conception of culture. Culture exists in the representations that individuals inherit from the traditions, tribes, or networks with which they associate, shared in various ways and to varying degrees. Aggregated value scores can offer researchers a useful proxy for prevailing cultural representations that saturate a population without need to assume that a value system exists apart from people, artifacts and institutions.

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Notes

1. Perhaps this is why Fischer and Schwartz (2011) found that country accounts for more variance in the somewhat more concrete World Value Survey (WVS) items than in Portrait Value Survey (PVS) or Schwartz Value Survey (SVS) items.
2. Schwartz (2006) defined culture expansively “as the rich complex of meanings, beliefs, practices, symbols, norms and values prevalent among people in a society” (p. 138), and defended an empirical focus on values as a merely an especially efficient way of studying cultures. Schwartz (2013) is more categorical, defining culture as the value system “external to the individual, which underlies and justifies the functioning of social institutions” (p. 5).
3. Schwartz (2006) found that the effects of societal institutions on behavior are mediated by values such as autonomy and egalitarianism: They account for effects of democratic government on social attitudes (e.g., unconditional respect for parents, acceptance of abortion and divorce; Table 3) and the effects of family size on political behaviors (opposition to immigrants, membership in voluntary organizations, political activism; Table 4). He explicitly argued against the interpretation that cultural orientations influence individuals through these social structures (Footnotes 14, 16). However, Schwartz (2013) allows no direct influence of cultural values on individuals: “Institutions mediate the effects of culture on individuals” (p. 5).

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