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What is This?

Beyond the striking differences in the value priorities of groups is a surprisingly widespread consensus regarding the hierarchical order of values. Average value hierarchies of representative and near representative samples from 13 nations exhibit a similar pattern that replicates with school teachers in 56 nations and college students in 54 nations. Benevolence, self-direction, and universalism values are consistently most important; power, tradition, and stimulation values are least important; and security, conformity, achievement, and hedonism are in between. Value hierarchies of 83% of samples correlate at least .80 with this pan-cultural hierarchy. To explain the pan-cultural hierarchy, the authors discuss its adaptive functions in meeting the requirements of successful societal functioning. The authors demonstrate, with data from Singapore and the United States, that correctly interpreting the value hierarchies of groups requires comparison with the pan-cultural normative baseline.

VALUE HIERARCHIES ACROSS CULTURES
Taking a Similarities Perspective

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Studies of the nature and implications of individual value differences have seen a renaissance in recent years (e.g., Mayton, Loges, Ball-Rokeach, & Grube, 1994; Schwartz, 1992; Seligman, Olson, & Zanna, 1996). Studies at the national level have also documented differences in the value aspects of cultures around the world and explicated their sources and implications (e.g., Hofstede, 1982, 1991; Inglehart, 1997; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Schwartz, 1997; Smith & Schwartz, 1997; Triandis, 1995). These studies reveal a great deal of variation in the value priorities of individuals within societies as well as groups across nations. The research suggests that individuals both within and across societies have quite different value priorities that reflect their different genetic heritage, personal experiences, social locations, and enculturation. Yet hidden behind these important differences is a surprise that may reflect something about the origins and role of values for human society.

Researchers, including ourselves, have focused almost exclusively on differences in value priorities. When we switch our focus to ask about similarities, we discover a striking

degree of consensus across individuals and societies. Certain values are especially important (e.g., honesty and other prosocial values), and others are much less important (e.g., wealth and other power values). We also find that there are some values for which consensus regarding their importance is low (e.g., pleasure and other hedonism values).

This article adds a similarity perspective to the usual examination of differences. Its purpose is twofold. First, we wish to contribute to basic knowledge and theory by reporting evidence for agreement around the world on the relative importance of different values. We will suggest explanations for this agreement. Second, we wish to develop and illustrate the argument that a distorted understanding of a group's culture often emerges if one examines the group's value profile in isolation. To reveal distinctive and informative aspects of a single culture, it is best to compare it with a cross-cultural baseline (cf. Campbell & Naroll, 1972).

In what follows, we briefly describe a comprehensive set of 10 types of values that were recognized in almost every nation of 63 nations we have studied (e.g., security, hedonism, achievement) (Schwartz, 1992, 1994). We then present the average importance ratings given to these value types across nations from around the world. We also report the order of importance of the 10 types of values across nations. These data establish a pan-cultural baseline of value endorsement. Groups vary substantially around this baseline in the importance that their members attribute to values. At the same time, there is considerable consensus regarding the relative importance and unimportance of certain values. We therefore address the question of why particular values enjoy such widespread endorsement and why others are assigned lesser importance. Finally, we illustrate, with data from Singapore and from the United States, how interpretation of the value priorities of a group changes and becomes more informative when we compare these priorities to the pan-cultural normative baseline.

THE SET OF VALUE TYPES

We define values as desirable, transsituational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in people's lives (see Schwartz, 1992, for a fuller elaboration; cf. Rokeach, 1973, and Kluckhohn, 1951). The crucial content aspect that distinguishes among values is the type of motivational goal they express. We derived 10 motivationally distinct types of values intended to be comprehensive of the core values recognized in cultures around the world from universal requirements of the human condition. These types covered the content categories we found in earlier value theories, in value questionnaires from different cultures, and in religious and philosophical discussions of values. We characterize each type of values by describing its central motivational goal. Table 1 lists the value types, each defined in terms of its central goal. A set of specific single values that primarily represents each value type appears in parentheses, following the definition. A specific value represents a type when actions that express the value or lead to its attainment promote the central goal of the type.

Multidimensional analyses of the relations among the single values within each of 47 cultures provided replications that supported the discrimination of the postulated 10 value types (Schwartz, 1992, 1994; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995). These analyses within each culture also established that the 45 single values listed in Table 1 have nearly equivalent meanings across cultures. These 45 values formed consistent and internally reliable subsets that serve to index the 10 value types.[1] To assess the comprehensiveness of the 10 value types, we invited researchers to add values of significance in their culture that were missing in the survey. Researchers in each of 18 countries added up to six values. Analyses including the added

TABLE 1
Definitions of Motivational Types of Values in Terms of
Their Goals and the Single Values That Represent Them[a]

Power: Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources (social power, authority, wealth, preserving my public image)

Achievement: Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards (successful, capable, ambitious, influential)

Hedonism: Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself (pleasure, enjoying life)

Stimulation: Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life (daring, a varied life, an exciting life)

Self-direction: Independent thought and action choosing, creating, exploring (creativity, freedom, independent, curious, choosing own goals)

Universalism: Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature (broad-minded, wisdom, social justice, equality, a world at peace, a world of beauty, unity with nature, protecting the environment)

Benevolence: Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact (helpful, honest, forgiving, loyal, responsible)

Tradition: Respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide the self (humble, accepting my portion in life, devout, respect for tradition, moderate)

Conformity: Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms (politeness, obedient, self-discipline, honoring parents and elders)

Security: Safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of self (family security, national security, social order, clean, reciprocation of favors)

a. The following values that were included in the inventory are not used in forming indexes of the importance of each value type because they do not exhibit equivalence of meaning across cultures: social recognition, intelligent, self-respect, inner harmony, true friendship, a spiritual life, mature love, meaning in life, detachment, sense of belonging, healthy.

values revealed that they showed the same pattern of correlations with other values as the core values from the appropriate motivational value types. This indicates that they identified no missing motivational content. This supported the view that the set of 10 types probably does not exclude any significant types of basic values.[2] The assumption of near-comprehensive coverage of the basic values recognized across cultures is important when interpreting the findings we present below.

Our earlier research has also established the existence of a near-universal structure of relations among the 10 value types. Individuals and groups may differ substantially in the importance they attribute to the values that constitute the value types. However, the same coherent structure of motivational oppositions and compatibilities apparently organizes their values (Schwartz, 1992, 1994; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995).

The research we use to assess similarity and difference in value hierarchies around the world is based on individuals' self-reports of the importance they attribute to values. Such self-reports might reflect lip service to values rather than true endorsement. It is therefore critical to establish that self-reports of value priorities relate meaningfully to actual behavior. For this purpose, we briefly mention some of the work from around the world that addresses this issue. Following is a sample of behaviors and behavioral intentions to which values, measured with the same instruments we employ, are related in the hypothesized manner: choice of medical specialty, choice of university major, consumer purchases, cooperation and competition, counselee behavioral style, delinquent behavior, environmental behavior, intergroup social contact, occupational choice, religiosity and religious observance, and

voting (Barnea & Schwartz, 1998; Bianchi & Rosova, 1992; Bond & Chi, 1997; Grunert & Juhl, 1995; Karp, 1996; Puohiniemi, 1995; Roccas & Schwartz, 1997; Ros, Grad, & Alvaro, 1994; Sagiv, 1997; Sagiv & Schwartz, 1995; Schubot, Eliason, & Cayley, 1995; Schwartz, 1996; Schwartz & Barnea, 1995; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995; Srnec, 1995).

This evidence for the systematic relation of value priorities to behavior comes from a wide range of countries around the world (Brazil, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United States, and Venezuela). There is evidence from Finland and Israel, moreover, that socially desirable responding does not confound self-reported values (Schwartz, Verkasalo, Antonovsky, & Sagiv, 1997). That is, the tendency to present oneself as graced by the qualities especially valued in one's own group or society is unrelated to the tendency to report that values are important. The confirmation of various hypotheses relating values to behavior supports the assumption that the self-reported values in the current study reflect real priorities rather than mere verbalizations.

IDENTIFYING VALUE HIERARCHIES ACROSS NATIONS

We next present empirical research that examines the value hierarchies of individuals in different nations. We identify a set of cross-cultural similarities and differences and then develop explanations for them. Similarities in value hierarchies imply that there are basic, knowable principles that account for the order of values in human societies.

METHOD

All researchers used native language versions of the 56- (57) item Schwartz (1992) value survey developed with rigorous back-translation procedures. The survey included the values listed in Table 1 plus any added values, each followed by a short explanatory phrase in parentheses. Respondents rated each value for importance as a guiding principle in their own life on a 9-point scale from –1 (*opposed to my principles*) to 0 (*not important*) to 7 (*of supreme importance*). Because people typically view values as desirable, values generally range from somewhat to very important. The asymmetry of the scale reflects the discriminations individuals made when thinking about the importance of values, observed in pretests. We computed indexes of the importance of each value type by averaging the importance ratings of the specific values representative of that type (listed in Table 1).

We base our inferences on three different sets of samples. First and most important, we discuss findings in a set of representative or near-representative samples of 13 nations or of regions within them: Australia—a near-representative sample of Adelaide adults ($n = 199$); Chile—a representative national sample ($n = 304$); China—a near-representative sample of Shanghai factory workers ($n = 208$); East Germany—a near-representative sample of Chemnitz adults ($n = 295$); Finland—two representative national samples averaged ($n = 3,120$); France—a representative national sample ($n = 2,339$); Israel—a near-representative sample of Jerusalem adults ($n = 170$); Italy—a representative national sample ($n = 210$); Japan—a representative sample of Osaka adults ($n = 207$); the Netherlands—a representative national sample of employed males ($n = 240$); Russia—a representative sample of Moscow adults ($n = 189$); South Africa—a representative sample of employed Whites in Midrand ($n = 249$); and West Germany—a near-representative sample of adults from several states ($n = 213$). The Australian, Chinese, East and West German, Israeli, and Italian samples

were chosen in a manner intended to represent subgroups in proportions similar to their population proportions, but rigorous sampling techniques were not employed.

These samples cover the full range of ages, gender, occupations, educational levels, and so on. Moreover, the set of nations varies substantially in terms of cultural region, religion, political and economic systems, history, and socioeconomic development. It includes nations from Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, East Europe, West Europe, and Oceania. Similarities across this set of samples are likely to reflect elements common to humanity rather than similarities limited to particular groups.

Data from two other sets of samples enable us to assess whether any similarities observed across these 13 nations also characterize more specific groups and generalize across a larger set of nations. We examined whether the results of the national sample analysis replicated in samples of school teachers (Grades 3 to 12) from 56 nations (N = approximately 14,000) and in samples of college students from 54 nations (N = approximately 19,000). Both these sets of occupationally matched samples have more education than the general public and have been socialized more in school settings. To the extent that their value hierarchies resemble those of national samples, we can have greater confidence that what we observe constitutes a pan-cultural pattern. The nations in the three sets of samples only partly overlap. Consequently, we base conclusions on data from 63 nations.

Table 2 lists the nations, locations within them studied, and year of data gathering. All samples included at least 100 respondents, with most in the 180 to 300 range and a few more than a thousand. Where there were multiple samples of teachers or of students from one nation or location, their ratings were averaged to yield a single rating. Each nation received equal weight in the analyses.

VALUE IMPORTANCE: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

The left side of Table 3 presents the mean importance ratings of the 10 value types averaged across the 13 representative or near-representative samples. Benevolence was the value type rated most important. Self-direction and universalism tied for second and third most important; security was fourth, and conformity was fifth. The five less important value types were, in order, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, tradition, and power. Self-direction, security, and universalism did not differ significantly from one another in importance, nor did achievement differ from hedonism. The differences among all other value types were significant ($p < .05$, two-tailed).[3]

The key question is as follows: How similar is the value hierarchy that characterizes each national sample to the average hierarchy across nations? Before addressing that question, however, we ask, Does the average value hierarchy based on representative or near-representative samples also characterize more specific groups and generalize across a larger set of nations? Consider the data for schoolteachers. Teachers are particularly interesting because they are the largest occupational group in most societies and presumably serve as value transmitters in society.

The middle section of Table 3 presents the mean importance ratings of the ten value types averaged across 77 teacher samples from 56 nations. Benevolence was the value type rated most important, self-direction was second, universalism third, security fourth, and conformity fifth. The five less important value types were, in order, achievement, hedonism, tradition, stimulation, and power. This order was almost identical to that for the representative national samples (r_s = .98), except for the slightly higher rating of self-direction compared with universalism and the reversal of tradition and stimulation. The Pearson correlation

TABLE 2
Nations, Locations Studied, and Year of Data Gathering

Nation	Location Studied	Years
Argentina	Buenos Aires	T-1995, S-1995
Australia	Adelaide and Queensland	T-1992, S-1988, R-1992
Austria	Graz	S-1997
Belgium	Flemish	S-1991
Bolivia	La Paz	T-1993
Brazil	Brasilia	T-1993, 1995; S-1989, 1995
Bulgaria	Sophia	T-1992, 1995; S-1992, 1995
Canada	Toronto	T-1993, S-1993
Chile	Santiago, Temuco, National	T-1995, 1997; S-1994
China	Guangzhou, Hebei, Shanghai	T-1988, 1989; S-1988, 1995; R-1990
Cyprus	Limassol (Greek)	T-1992, S-1992
Czech Republic	Prague	T-1993, S-1993
Denmark	Copenhagen	T-1991, 1995
England	London, Surrey	T-1995, S-1990
Estonia	Tallinn and Rural	T-1990, S-1990
Fiji	Suva	S-1991
Finland	Helsinki and National	T-1989, S-1989, R-1991, 1994
France	Paris, Lyon, and National	T-1991, S-1996, R-1994
Georgia	Tbilisi	T-1992, S-1992
Germany (East)	Berlin, Chemnitz	T-1991; S-1991, 1994; R-1996
Germany (West)	Trier, Berlin, National	T-1990; S-1989, 1994; R-1996
Ghana	Accra	T-1995, S-1995
Greece	Athens	T-1989, S-1989
Hong Kong	Hong Kong	T-1988, 1996; S-1988, 1996
Hungary	Budapest	T-1990, 1995; S-1990, 1995
India	Allahabad and Patna (Hindu)	T-1991, S-1992
Indonesia	Jakarta, Yogyakarta	T-1994, 1996; S-1994
Ireland	Dublin	T-1996
Israel Jewish	Jerusalem and National	T-1990; S-1990, 1995; R-1996
Israel Arab	Galilee, Jerusalem	T-1990
Italy	Rome and National	T-1989; S-1989, 1991; R-1997
Japan	Hyogo, Osaka, Tokyo, Hokaido	T-1989, 1996; S-1989, 1990, 1996; R-1991
Macedonia	Skopje	T-1995; S-1995
Malaysia	Penang	T-1989; S-1989
Mexico	Mexico City	T-1990, 1995
Namibia	Windhoek	T-1997
Nepal	Katmandu	T-1993; S-1992, 1993
Netherlands	Amsterdam and Nationwide	T-1988, 1996; S-1988, 1996; R-1989
New Zealand	South Island	T-1998; S-1988
Nigeria	Ile-Ife	T-1995; S-1995
Norway	Olso	T-1994; S-1994
Peru	Lima	S-1996
Philippines	Metropolitan Manila	T-1996; S-1996
Poland	Warsaw	T-1998; S-1990, 1996
Portugal	Porto	T-1989; S-1989
Romania	Bucharest	S-1996
Russia	Moscow, Leningrad	T-1995; S-1996; R-1995
Singapore	Singapore	T-1991; S-1991
Slovakia	Bratislava	T-1991, 1996; S-1991
Slovenia	Ljubljana	T-1991, S-1991-1992

(continued)

TABLE 2 Continued

Nation	Location Studied	Years
South Korea	Nationwide	S-1993
South Africa	Pochefstroom, Midrand	S-1994, 1996; R-1992
Spain	Madrid	T-1988, 1996; S-1988
Sweden	Stockholm	T-1993; S-1993
Switzerland	Lausanne (French)	T-1988; S-1988, 1996
Taiwan	Taipei	T-1993, 1995
Thailand	Bangkok	T-1991
Turkey	Istanbul and Ankara	T-1990; S-1994, 1995
Uganda	Kampala	T-1995; S-1995
United States	Illinois, Seattle, California, Mississippi, Washington, D.C.	T-1990, 1994, 1996; S-1989, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1996
Venezuela	Caracas	T-1993; S-1989
Zimbabwe	Harare	T-1989; S-1989

NOTE: T signifies teacher samples, S signifies student samples, and R signifies representative or near-representative samples.

between the mean value ratings by the teacher and representative samples is .98. Every value type differed significantly ($p < .01$) from every other type, except for self-direction/universalism and tradition/stimulation.

The observed order of the value types among teachers might reflect oversampling nations from some regions of the world and undersampling nations from other regions. To check this possibility, we recalculated the mean importance of each value type, giving equal weight to eight different regions of the world: Western Europe, Eastern Europe, North America, South and Central America, East Asia, Africa, Oceania, and the Middle East.[4] The order of importance of the 10 value types obtained by equally weighting world regions was identical to the order based on equally weighting the 56 nations. Moreover, the importance means for the 10 value types were very similar for both weighting schemes ($r = .99$).[5]

To assess further whether the average value hierarchy based on representative or near-representative samples constitutes a pan-cultural average, consider the data for college students. The proportion of the population that attends college varies considerably across nations. Hence, students may differ some on background and other characteristics across nations. If they too order values in ways similar to the national samples, they can add to our confidence that the value ratings we observed reflect a true pan-cultural average. In addition, the student data provide pan-cultural value norms useful to researchers, because students are the most common type of sample they study.

Table 3 (right side) presents results for 81 student samples from the 54 nations. Benevolence values were most important on average, self-direction second, and universalism third, followed by achievement, security, conformity, hedonism, stimulation, tradition, and power. With the exceptions of benevolence/self-direction and security/conformity/achievement, every value type differed significantly in importance ($p < .01$) from every other type. This order is similar to that for the representative national samples ($r_s = .96$), except for the higher rating of self-direction versus universalism and the reordering of achievement, security, and conformity in the middle of the value hierarchy. The Pearson correlation between the value ratings by student and representative samples is .97. For the student samples, we also recomputed the means to give equal weight to the eight different regions of the world.

TABLE 3
Cross-National Importance of Individual Value Types

Value Type	Representative (13 nations)		Teachers (56 nations)		Students (54 nations)		Difference (teacher – students)
	Mean Rating	Mean Rank	Mean Rating	Mean Rank	Mean Rating	Mean Rank	
Benevolence	4.72 (.27)	1	4.68 (.28)	1	4.59 (.25)	1	.09
Self-direction	4.42 (.27)	2.5	4.45 (.31)	2	4.58 (.31)	2	–.13*
Universalism	4.42 (.18)	2.5	4.41 (.31)	3	4.25 (.29)	3	.16*
Security	4.38 (.42)	4	4.25 (.39)	4	3.99 (.36)	5	.26**
Conformity	4.19 (.47)	5	4.17 (.47)	5	3.98 (.48)	6	.19*
Achievement	3.85 (.39)	6	3.85 (.34)	6	4.02 (.30)	4	–.17*
Hedonism	3.73 (.52)	7	3.41 (.59)	7	3.82 (.65)	7	–.41**
Stimulation	3.08 (.39)	8	2.92 (.41)	9	3.43 (.34)	8	–.51**
Tradition	2.85 (.55)	9	3.02 (.45)	8	2.73 (.48)	9	.29**
Power	2.35 (.41)	10	2.38 (.55)	10	2.39 (.43)	10	.01

NOTE: Standard deviations in parentheses.
*$p < .05$. **$p < .001$; two-tailed.

This yielded an identical order of importance among value types for student samples and had little effect on the means ($r = .98$).

Considering these three sets of data, it seems reasonable to maintain that the average value hierarchy found in the representative and near-representative samples may reflect a true pan-cultural average fairly well. Benevolence consistently emerges at the top of the value hierarchy, with self-direction and universalism close behind. Security, conformity, and achievement are located in the middle of the hierarchy, followed by hedonism. Stimulation, tradition, and power are at the bottom of the hierarchy, with power consistently last.

Given the widespread research evidence of value differences between individuals and groups, the observed similarity of the average value hierarchies may seem surprising at first sight. It is important to recognize, therefore, that even when value hierarchies are ordered similarly, value ratings may differ meaningfully and reliably. We illustrate this by comparing the values of the teacher and student samples. Comparisons between nations from different cultural regions yield equally meaningful differences.[6] Although the average value priorities of the teacher and student samples are quite similar ($r = .93$, $r_s = .95$), there are significant differences on 8 of the 10 value types (see Table 3, last column). The differences are what one would expect considering differences between these two groups.

Teachers are older than students, more embedded in established social institutions and roles, and more caught up in networks of mutual obligation. Thus, they are more tied to the status quo and less open to change. This can account for why teachers attribute more

importance than students to security, tradition, and conformity values and less importance to hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction values. The advanced academic studies that students are currently pursuing encourage openness to and tolerance of new and different ideas, yet they demand that students meet socially defined standards of achievement (Bowles & Gintis, 1976; Kohn & Schooler, 1983). This can account for why students attribute more importance than teachers to self-direction, universalism, and achievement values. The student-teacher comparison shows how groups that exhibit high overall similarity in their ratings of values may nonetheless differ substantially and meaningfully in their specific value priorities.

CONSENSUS ON VALUE PRIORITIES: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Having established the average orderings of the importance of the 10 value types observed across nations, we are in a position to address the key question of consensus. To what extent do the averages reflect the ordering of value priorities within different nations? Are they merely averages, or do they also represent some degree of agreement regarding value priorities across nations? We assessed the degree of agreement or consensus on value priorities among nations by comparing the ratings and order in each sample with the average (pan-cultural) ratings and order. We did this separately for the sets of (near-)representative, teacher, and student samples. Specifically, we computed Pearson correlations between the average rating of the value types across the set of samples and their rating within each national sample from that set (see Table 4). We also computed the Spearman rank correlations. To avoid autocorrelation, we excluded each sample from the ratings of the set of samples with which it was correlated.

For the 13 (near-)representative national samples (see Table 4, left side), the mean Pearson correlation[7] across nations was .92, and the median correlation was .92 (median r_s was .91). The weakest correlation was for Chile (.80); the strongest was for White South Africans (.97). These correlations indicate a substantial degree of agreement in nations from around the world regarding which value types are relatively important and which relatively unimportant. Does this consensus hold for more specific samples and for a much larger set of nations? Results for the teacher and student samples shed light on this question.

For teachers (see Table 4, center), the mean Pearson correlation between the national hierarchy and the average teacher sample hierarchy across the 56 nations was .90, and the median correlation was .90. Of the correlations, 91% were .75 or greater (median r_s = .88). Thus, the teacher samples also point to substantial agreement regarding the hierarchy of value types around the world. Of course, samples from different nations showed varying degrees of agreement, as shown in Table 4. But even the samples with the least similarity to the average teacher sample (Uganda and Nigeria) shared with it 50% of the variance in their value ratings.

This high degree of consensus is striking. Equally significant is the fact that, with one exception, the degree of consensus varied little across the regions of the world from which the samples came. The mean Pearson correlation was similar for 4 Middle Eastern nations or cultural groups (.91), 11 East European nations (.89), 15 West European (.91), 6 Latin American (.94), 2 North American (.95), 2 from Oceania (.95), and 11 East Asian nations (.89). The 5 African nations (.80) had priorities somewhat less similar to the pan-cultural average. We will comment on possible regional differences after we examine the student data.

For students (see Table 4, right side), the mean Pearson correlation across the 54 nations was .91, and the median correlation was .91. Of the correlations, 91% were .75 or greater

TABLE 4
Pearson Correlations Between the Value Hierarchies Within Nations and Across Samples From Around the World[a]

Representative	Teacher Samples			Student Samples		
.97 S. Africa White	.98 Brazil (2)[b]	.93 Japan (2)	.87 Chile (2)	.98 Portugal	.94 Indonesia	.86 England
.96 Finland	.97 Hong Kong (2)	.93 Finland	.86 Turkey	.98 Slovenia	.93 Poland (2)	.86 W. Germany (2)
.96 Israel	.97 Israel Jews	.93 Hungary (2)	.86 Philippines	.98 Norway	.93 Japan (4)	.86 S. Korea
.95 East Germany	.97 Czech Republic	.93 New Zealand	.85 Macedonia	.97 Slovakia (2)	.93 Turkey	.85 Switzerland (2)
.95 Italy	.97 Norway	.92 Bulgaria (2)	.84 Zimbabwe	.97 Australia (2)	.93 Peru	.84 Netherlands (2)
.93 Netherlands	.97 Australia	.91 Slovenia	.84 Nepal	.96 Estonia (2)	.93 Finland	.84 S. Africa White (2)
.92 Australia	.97 Italy	.91 Cyprus	.84 Sweden	.96 Chile	.92 Bulgaria (2)	.81 China (2)
.90 Japan	.96 Ireland	.90 Namibia	.84 Denmark (2)	.96 Hungary (2)	.92 Spain	.79 Nepal (2)
.90 France	.96 Portugal	.89 Russia	.78 Bolivia	.96 Greece	.92 Israel Jews (3)	.79 Zimbabwe (2)
.87 Russia	.95 Venezuela	.89 Singapore	.77 East Germany	.96 Venezuela	.91 East Germany (2)	.78 Namibia
.83 China	.95 Canada	.88 Malaysia	.77 Ghana	.96 Hong Kong (2)	.91 Sweden	.78 Malaysia
.82 West Germany	.95 Taiwan (2)	.88 Netherlands (2)	.76 Indonesia (2)	.95 Italy (2)	.90 Singapore	.77 Russia
.80 Chile	.95 Argentina	.88 India	.75 China (3)	.95 Czech Republic	.89 Georgia	.75 India
	.95 United States (3)	.88 Spain	.74 France	.95 Canada	.89 France	.69 Philippines
	.95 Mexico (2)	.87 Israel Arabs (3)	.73 Switzerland	.95 Brazil	.89 United States (7)	.66 Ghana
	.94 Estonia (2)	.87 Austria	.72 Thailand	.95 Argentina	.89 New Zealand	.64 Nigeria
	.94 Poland	.87 West Germany (2)	.71 Nigeria	.94 Cyprus	.89 Macedonia	.62 Fiji
	.94 Slovakia (2)	.87 Georgia	.70 Uganda	.94 Romania	.88 Belgium (2)	.57 Uganda
	.94 England	.87 Greece				

a. Correlations are between nation and worldwide average minus that nation.
b. Number of samples averaged.

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(median r_s = .82). These findings too reflect a substantial degree of agreement regarding the relative importance of the 10 value types. Once again, except for Africa, consensus was high regardless of the region of the world from which the samples came. Mean Pearson correlations were similar for 3 Middle Eastern nations (.93), 12 East European (.93), 13 West European (.93), 5 Latin American (.95), 2 North American (.93), 3 from Oceania (.89), and 10 East Asian nations (.86). The 6 African nations had a mean Pearson correlation of only .73. For samples from 5 nations (Ghana, Fiji, Nigeria, Philippines, and Uganda), less than 50% of the variance in value ratings was shared with the pan-cultural normative baseline.

The observed pan-cultural similarity in value hierarchies implies that there are shared underlying principles that give rise to these hierarchies. In addition, diffusion of value priorities across neighboring nations might contribute to the level of observed consensus (Naroll, 1973). To examine the contribution of diffusion, we computed the mean Pearson correlation between the value priorities of each nation in a world region and the average hierarchy of the other nations in that region. To the extent that diffusion contributes to value consensus, these correlations should be higher than the mean correlation of the nations in a region with the pan-cultural value hierarchy. This would indicate higher regional than pan-cultural consensus or homogeneity, perhaps due to diffusion. We considered only those regions for which there were data from at least five nations.

For the African region, the mean within-region correlations (.92 for teachers, .94 for students) were indeed higher than correlations with the pan-cultural normative hierarchy (.80 and .73, respectively). For the other four regions, however, the differences were minimal. The within-region correlations were higher by only .01 on average. Thus, with the exception of Africa, there was little support for the importance of value diffusion within regions.

All the Black African student and teacher samples were unusual in that the average persons in these samples attributed more importance to conformity than to any other type of values. They also attributed unusually little importance to self-direction values. The Fiji and Philippine student samples, the only non-African samples whose value ratings shared less than 50% of their variance with the pan-cultural baseline, also rated conformity most important and self-direction unusually unimportant. Apparently, this is an alternative ordering of value priorities that prevails under conditions we will identify below.

In sum, the findings in the (near-)representative samples and their replications reveal substantial consensus regarding the importance of different types of values across all but the Black African nations. Beyond the widely recognized cross-cultural differences in value priorities, there is also a considerable degree of agreement on the relative importance of values. Below, we discuss possible origins of the observed pan-cultural value hierarchy and of the distinctive Black African value profile. First, however, we consider possible methodological threats to our conclusion.

THE SAMPLING OF VALUE ITEMS

We have assumed that the single values included in the value inventory are appropriate for revealing respondents' value hierarchies. Might the hierarchies observed depend, however, on the particular items sampled to represent each value type in the questionnaire? If so, we might find a different order of importance for the 10 value types if we sampled a different set of items that also fit the conceptual definitions of the value types from the universe of values. Two lines of reasoning and an empirical analysis suggest that this is unlikely.

Consider first the fact that there were 39 different language versions of the questionnaire. In each language, the value terms are different. Thus, each translation includes somewhat different sets of items to measure each value type. Nonetheless, the importance order of value types was similar across nations. This supports the view that the observed order of value priorities is relatively independent of the particular items selected.

Consider next the methods used to sample items. We compiled a long list of value items from the values literature; from existing surveys from Africa, the far East, and the West; and from texts of the world's major religions. We assigned items to value types a priori, according to their judged correspondence with the motivational goals of the types (Schwartz, 1992). For value types whose goals were not well covered, we added items. Then, we sampled a set of items for each type to cover the varied conceptual components of its motivational goal while minimizing redundancy. Crucially, the importance of single values played no role in this sampling procedure. There was therefore no bias working against sampling items in a way that reasonably represented the importance of the total set of items potentially available to measure each value type.

Finally, consider some empirical evidence. We generated equivalent forms of the survey by randomly splitting the value items that represent each value type. We then estimated the effects of item sampling on the relative importance of the value types by correlating the importance scores yielded by the two forms. To establish an accurate and stable estimate, we generated 20 different random splits of the sets of items, using the mean ratings for each value in the first 49 samples we gathered from 43 nations. The mean Pearson correlation across the 10 value types for the 20 pairs of equivalent forms was .82 (corrected for questionnaire length), and the range was .70 to .88. The mean Spearman rank correlation for the order of importance of the 10 types was .84 (range = .75 to .91).[8] These results suggest that the value ratings and ranks obtained with the current set of items are fairly close to the ratings and ranks one would obtain were an alternate set of items sampled to measure each value type. In sum, the observed value hierarchies are probably independent of the particular items sampled to represent each value type.

LIMITED APPROPRIATENESS OF THE VALUES INSTRUMENT FOR SOME POPULATIONS

The values instrument employed here requires respondents to evaluate the importance of abstract values, presented out of context, using a complex numerical scale to indicate their evaluations. As Schwartz, Melech, Lehmann, Burgess, and Harris (in press) note, this abstract task is inappropriate for some of the world's population and is likely to elicit unreliable and invalid value ratings. We expected few problems with the highly educated samples of teachers and students, but representative samples might be more problematic. To test the meaningfulness of responses, we examined whether the structure of relations among values within each sample resembled the theoretical prototype.

In all 13 representative samples and in all but 6 of the other 110 samples, the observed structure indicated that respondents understood the values largely as assumed a priori. In 6 samples—from Fiji, Namibia, Nigeria, Thailand, and Uganda—the evidence that all 10 value types were understood as postulated was somewhat weaker. Nonetheless, the responses were apparently sufficiently reliable to reveal the consistent alternative value hierarchy we discovered in these and in the other African samples.

PAN-CULTURAL NORMS: WHY?

We turn now to three intriguing questions raised by the fact of high cross-cultural consensus regarding the value hierarchy: First, why does the pan-cultural baseline of value priorities show the pattern that it does? That is, why is benevolence most important, power least important, and the other value types ordered in the ways observed? Second, what might lead to the relative consensus on this order? Third, why do the African samples diverge from the pan-cultural order? There are no definitive empirical answers to these questions. We propose plausible, theory-based answers that, we hope, will stimulate discussion that can lead to increased understanding.

The typology of 10 types of values that differ in their motivational content was derived by reasoning that values represent, in the form of conscious goals, three universal requirements of human existence: biological needs, requisites of coordinated social interaction, and demands of group survival and functioning (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987). One or more of these requirements underlie each value type (Schwartz, 1992, 1994). Groups and individuals represent these requirements cognitively as specific values about which they communicate to explain, coordinate, and rationalize behavior.

Individual differences in the importance attributed to values reflect individuals' unique needs, temperaments, and social experiences. But the pan-cultural similarities in value importance are likely to reflect the shared bases of values in human nature and the adaptive functions of each type of value in maintaining societies (e.g., Campbell, 1975; Parsons, 1951; Schwartz & Bardi, 1997; Williams, 1970). Most individuals are likely to oppose the pursuit of value priorities that clash with human nature. Socializers and social control agents are likely to discourage the pursuit of value priorities that clash with the smooth functioning of important groups or the larger society.[9]

The basic social function of values is to motivate and control the behavior of group members (Parsons, 1951). Two mechanisms are critical. First, social actors (e.g., leaders, interaction partners) invoke values to define particular behaviors as socially appropriate, to justify their demands on others, and to elicit desired behaviors. Second and equally important, values serve as internalized guides for individuals; they relieve the group of the necessity for constant social control. Value transmission, acquisition, and internalization occur as individuals adapt to the everyday customs, practices, norms, and scripts they encounter. Through modeling, reinforcement, and explicit verbal teaching, socializers consciously and unconsciously seek to instill values that promote group survival and prosperity. By definition, such values are socially desirable. Thus, an explanation of the pan-cultural value hierarchy is an explanation of why particular values are more or less socially desirable across nations.[10]

From the viewpoint of human nature and societal functioning, we propose that the following three requirements, ordered according to their importance, are especially relevant for explaining the observed pan-cultural value hierarchy.

1. Most important is to promote and preserve cooperative and supportive relations among members of primary groups. Without such relations, life in the group would be filled with conflict and group survival would be at risk. Hence, the most critical focus of value transmission is to develop commitment to positive relations, identification with the group, and loyalty to its members.
2. Positive relations are insufficient to ensure the survival and prosperity of societies, groups, and their individual members. Individuals must also be motivated to invest the time and the physi-

cal and intellectual effort needed to perform productive work, to solve problems that arise during task performance, and to generate new ideas and technical solutions.

3. Some gratification of the self-oriented needs and desires of group members is also critical. Rejecting all expression of self-oriented desires would produce individual frustration, withdrawal of investment in the group, and refusal to contribute to group goal attainment. Hence, it is socially functional to legitimize self-oriented behavior to the extent that it does not undermine group goals.

We now use these principles to develop our tentative explanation of the observed pan-cultural value hierarchy. The discussion first applies the first principle to the value types whose importance it helps to explain and then applies the second and third principles where relevant.

Positive, cooperative social relations, the basic requirement for smooth group functioning, are especially important in the context of the family, with its high interdependence and intense interaction (Kagitcibasi, 1996). Value acquisition occurs first in this context and later in other primary and secondary groups (Brim, 1966; Kohn & Schooler, 1983). Benevolence values (helpfulness, honesty, forgiveness, loyalty, responsibility) provide the internalized motivational base for cooperative and supportive social relations. These values are reinforced and modeled early and repeatedly, because they are critical to assure required behaviors even in the absence of real or threatened sanctions. Benevolence values are therefore of utmost importance pan-culturally (1st).

Universalism values (e.g., social justice, equality, broad-mindedness) also contribute to positive social relations. But universalism values differ from benevolence values in their focus on all others, most significantly on those outside the in-group. Universalism values are functionally important primarily when group members must relate to those with whom they do not readily identify. Commitment to the welfare of nonprimary group members is critical in schools, workplaces, and other extrafamilial settings. Universalism values are less crucial when most interaction is limited to the primary group. Indeed, universalism values might even threaten in-group solidarity during times of intergroup conflict. Therefore, although universalism values are high in the pan-cultural hierarchy (2nd, 3rd), they are less important than benevolence values.

Security (4th, 5th) and conformity (5th, 6th) values are also fairly important pan-culturally, probably because harmonious relations among group members depend on avoiding conflict and violations of group norms. Security and conformity values are likely to be acquired in response to demands and in response to sanctions for self-restriction, avoiding risks, and controlling forbidden impulses. Hence, these values may interfere with gratifying self-oriented needs and desires, the third basis for value importance mentioned above. As a result, some negative affect is likely to accompany socialization for these values. Moreover, security and conformity values emphasize maintaining the status quo (Schwartz, 1992). They may therefore weaken the motivation to innovate in finding solutions to group tasks, the second basis for value importance we proposed. Thus, despite their contribution to harmonious social relations, security and conformity values are rated lower in the pan-cultural importance hierarchy than benevolence and universalism values.

Accepting and acting on tradition values can also contribute to group solidarity and thus to smooth group functioning and survival. However, tradition values largely concern individuals' commitment to the abstract beliefs and symbols that represent groups (Schwartz, 1992). They find little expression in the everyday social behavior that interaction partners have a vital interest in controlling. Hence, people in most countries attribute relatively low importance to tradition values as guiding principles (9th, 8th) in their lives.

Power values are located at the bottom of the pan-cultural hierarchy (10th), with very high consensus regarding their relatively low importance. This is also attributable to the requirement of positive relations among group members. Power values emphasize dominance over people and resources. Their pursuit often entails harming or exploiting others, thereby disrupting and damaging social relations. On the other hand, power values are congruent with the gratification of self-oriented desires, the third basis of importance noted above. It is probably necessary to grant some legitimacy to power strivings in order to motivate individual efforts to work for group interests and in order to justify the hierarchical social arrangements in all societies.

Self-direction values have strong implications for meeting the functional requirement of motivating individuals to work productively. By promoting independence of thought and action, exploration, and creativity, self-direction values foster group members' innovativeness and their intrinsically motivated investment in finding the best ways to get the group's tasks done. Action based on self-direction values contributes to group prosperity in normal times; it is crucial to meet the challenges posed by change in times of crisis. Moreover, intrinsically motivated actions satisfy self-oriented needs and desires by definition. Because self-direction values constitute an intrinsic source of motivation, their pursuit need not come at the expense of others who compete for social rewards. Hence, they rarely pose a threat to positive relations in the group. Thus, self-direction values substantially advance the 2nd and 3rd basic social functions of values without undermining the first. Consequently, they receive high importance (2nd) in the pan-cultural hierarchy.

Achievement values are attributed moderate importance pan-culturally (6th, 4th). This level of importance may reflect a compromise among the three bases of value importance. Achievement values, as defined and operationalized here, emphasize demonstrating competence according to social standards of success. On the positive side, achievement values motivate individuals to invest their time and energy in performing tasks that serve group interests. They also legitimize self-enhancing behavior, so long as it contributes to group welfare. On the negative side, achievement values may motivate individuals to devote so much effort to demonstrating their own worth that they thwart optimal attainment of group goals. Moreover, such self-interested behavior is also likely to disrupt harmonious, positive social relations. Assigning moderate importance to achievement values creates a balance between motivating people to work for the group, gratifying self-oriented desires, and avoiding disruption of social relations among group members.

The location of hedonism (7th) and stimulation (8th, 9th) values low in the pan-cultural hierarchy reflects their irrelevance for the first two requirements that underlie value importance. They are relevant to the third requirement, however. Hedonism and stimulation values are social transformations of the needs of the individual, as a biological organism, for physical gratification and optimal arousal (Schwartz, 1992). Societies must be organized to allow and legitimize some gratification of self-oriented desires. But socializers are unlikely to actively inculcate such values because they serve mainly individual interests. Hedonism and stimulation values are probably more important than power values because their pursuit, in contrast to power values, does not necessarily threaten positive social relations.

Self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Ryan, 1995) provides another explanation for the high importance of benevolence and self-direction values across all human societies. It argues that relatedness, community, autonomy, and personal growth are the major psychological needs whose fulfillment is intrinsically satisfying. Consequently, the goals to which these needs direct us are salient and central to most individuals. Benevolence and

self-direction values, respectively, express the goals based on relatedness and community and on autonomy and personal growth. This theory also designates a set of needs that underlie extrinsic goals—money, fame, power, and image. The pursuit of these goals does not bring direct satisfaction, so they are inherently less salient and central. These are the goals of power values, the least important value type across cultures.

Our analysis of the bases of the pan-cultural value hierarchy leaves unexplained the different pattern observed in the Black African samples and in Fiji. The average respondents in these samples differed from the pan-cultural norms primarily in attributing the highest importance to conformity values and low importance to self-direction values. If the preceding analysis is correct, then distinctive aspects of the social structural context these samples encounter should explain this unusual pattern of value priorities. We next propose some suggestions.[11]

All these samples come from nations that are neither industrialized nor Westernized. But industrialization is not the key: Some samples from industrialized Western nations also show relatively low consensus with the pan-cultural norms (e.g., French and Swiss teachers). We postulate that the distinctive characteristics of the households in which the African samples grew up are most important in determining the unique African value profile—large size (average above 10 persons) and diversity (e.g., multigenerational, with children of different mothers). Indeed, the average household size and birth rates in these nations are substantially higher than in all other nations we studied, including even those from East Asia.

Most primary groups in these African nations consist of large numbers of persons, organized in a hierarchical family, living in close proximity and high interdependence, with little room for privacy. Successful coordination of behavior in such circumstances requires conformity: norms regulating almost all domains of life, obedience to norms and to the demands of authority, and restraint of individual impulses or inclinations that might violate normative arrangements. Conformity values are therefore crucial to group survival and positive relations. Benevolence values may be less effective and hence less important because the large number of people and the diversity of relationships in the household may weaken the identification with close others that underlies these values.

In contrast, self-direction values are likely to disrupt group relations in these circumstances, because they encourage individuals to develop and pursue unique modes of action and thought. Socializers are therefore less likely to reinforce and cultivate them. A key mechanism for the development of a sense of an autonomous, self-directed self, according to Shweder and Bourne (1982), is privacy for children. This is not possible in large but poor households, and its absence may inhibit the growth of self-direction values. Equally important, most groups in these societies have lived in relatively stable environments in which the daily challenges are fairly routine (Lerner, 1964; Webster, 1984). Consequently, a critical social function of self-direction values discussed above—fostering innovativeness in times of change and crisis—is less relevant.

This brief analysis of the divergent African findings implies that the widespread pan-cultural normative value hierarchy is dependent on social structural characteristics shared by most but not all contemporary nations. The normative hierarchy is not present where basic social structural characteristics are different. Africa aside, the observed agreement between the value hierarchies in particular nations and the pan-cultural normative order is at most weakly related to industrialization. Nations high, moderate, and low in industrialization are among those with relatively high and relatively low correlations between their own and the pan-cultural value hierarchy (see Table 4). Thus, this hierarchy is probably based in shared

requirements of human existence that are present in all societies that are at least minimally industrialized.

INTERPRETING AND MISINTERPRETING VALUE HIERARCHIES

In this section, we explicate the view that one must take account of pan-cultural value norms to develop meaningful and informative interpretations of the value hierarchies of samples in any country. Just as one must interpret personality scores in light of the scores for normative samples, so value ratings take on clear meaning only in light of the pan-cultural normative baseline. For example, consider a male who scores 99 in neuroticism and 105 in conscientiousness on the NEO-PI-R; because the normative score for the former is lower than for the latter, he is considered high in neuroticism but low in conscientiousness (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Describing him as more conscientious than neurotic, based on raw scores, would be a serious misinterpretation. Analogously, ignoring pan-cultural norms when interpreting the value hierarchy of individuals or samples from a cultural group can lead to serious misunderstandings.

We explicate this point by discussing interpretations of the value hierarchies of groups from Singapore and from the United States. First, we interpret the value priorities of these groups by considering the relative importance of the value types within the group itself. We then reinterpret the findings in light of the pan-cultural norms, adopting a comparative approach. Because ranking of value types is less sensitive to group differences than ratings of value importance, we focus on ratings. The comparative analyses yield interesting insights into the nature of the two cultures.

SINGAPORE TEACHERS

Agnes Chang Shook Cheong gathered the Singapore data in 1992 from 149 schoolteachers from four primary and secondary schools selected to be representative of teachers in Singapore. Table 5 (far left column) presents the average importance ratings of the 10 value types in this sample. The average Singapore teacher rated security values most important, benevolence values a close second, and power values least important.

Based on the value hierarchy of this sample, without considering the pan-cultural norms, the following characterization seems reasonable: These data suggest a country where the average person is very concerned with maintaining safe and smooth social relations (security, 1st), with helping members of their close groups (benevolence, 2nd), and with avoiding upsetting others in their close groups (conformity, 3rd). There is also a fair amount of commitment to the welfare of those who are different (universalism, 4th) and some willingness to encourage individuals to think and act freely (self-direction, 5th). There is little acceptance of self-indulgence (hedonism and stimulation, 8th and 9th) and even less of power and authority (power, 10th). Although achievement and tradition values are of some importance, they are relatively weak guiding principles.

Now consider these Singaporean ratings in light of the pan-cultural norms on the right side of Table 5. What stands out is the extraordinary emphasis on maintaining the status quo of undisturbed social relations and following traditions: Security, conformity, and tradition values are all much more important than usual, with ratings about one full standard deviation above the pan-cultural norms. Commitment to the welfare of in-group members is average

TABLE 5
Importance of Individual Value Types for Singapore
Teachers Compared With Pan-Cultural Teacher Norms

Singapore Teachers			Pan-Cultural Norms		
Mean Rating	Mean Rank	Value Type	Mean Rank	Mean Rating	Rating Difference
4.71	1	Security	4	4.25	.46
4.67	2	Benevolence	1	4.68	–.01
4.56	3	Conformity	5	4.17	.39
4.25	4	Universalism	3	4.41	–.16
3.97	5	Self-direction	2	4.45	–.48
3.60	6	Achievement	6	3.85	–.25
3.58	7	Tradition	8	3.02	.56
2.91	8	Hedonism	7	3.41	–.50
2.78	9	Stimulation	9	2.92	–.14
2.47	10	Power	10	2.38	.09

(benevolence), but concern for those who are different (universalism) is relatively low (.5 standard deviations below the norm). Moreover, there is strikingly little emphasis on individual independence of thought and action (self-direction, 1.5 standard deviations below the norm) and even less emphasis on self-indulgence than is usual (hedonism, .8 standard deviations below the norm). The low rating of power values is typical, so it indicates no unusual rejection of power.

In contrast to the interpretation based on the Singaporean value hierarchy viewed in isolation, the comparative view characterizes the average person in Singapore as one who holds very conservative values. The comparative view is true to the descriptions of the culture of Singapore both by those who praise its uniqueness and its rejection of Western values (e.g., Mahbubani, 1992) and by those who worry about the lack of concern for individual autonomy they find there (e.g., Huntington, 1993).

UNITED STATES STUDENTS

Data were gathered between 1989 and 1995 from seven samples of American students at five universities in different regions of the country: California State University, Bakersfield ($n = 252$), Howard University ($n = 136$), University of Illinois (two samples, $n = 614$), University of Mississippi ($n = 172$), and University of Washington (two samples, $n = 514$).[12] Students were broadly representative of undergraduates at each university. Although value priorities varied somewhat across samples, all seven samples were quite similar to one another when compared with those from other countries around the world (Schwartz & Ros, 1995). We weighted each university equally in computing the average importance ratings for American students presented on the left side of Table 6. These students rated benevolence values most important, achievement values second, hedonism values a close third, and power values least important.

The value hierarchy of this sample, viewed in isolation, suggests a country where the average student gives a great deal of priority to the welfare of close others (benevolence), although not to those outside the in-group (universalism, 7th). The average student does not accept the idea of pursuing selfish interests at the expense of others (power, 10th) and shows

TABLE 6
Importance of Individual Value Types for United States
Students Compared With Pan-Cultural Student Norms

United States Students			Pan-Cultural Norms		
Mean Rating	Mean Rank	Value Type	Mean Rank	Mean Rating	Rating Difference
4.70	1	Benevolence	1	4.59	.11
4.54	2	Achievement	4	4.02	.52
4.52	3	Hedonism	7	3.82	.70
4.37	4	Self-direction	2	4.58	−.21
4.18	5	Conformity	6	3.98	.20
3.86	6	Security	5	3.99	−.13
3.77	7	Universalism	3	4.25	−.48
3.53	8	Stimulation	8	3.43	.10
2.87	9	Tradition	9	2.73	.14
2.67	10	Power	10	2.39	.28

minimal interest in maintaining tradition (tradition, 9th). Gratification of sensual desires is important (hedonism, 3rd) but not through the pursuit of novelty and excitement (stimulation, 8th). Seeking success according to social standards is an important guiding principle (achievement, 2nd) as is autonomy in thinking and acting (self-direction, 4th). Avoiding disruption of interpersonal relations (conformity, 5th) and maintaining a safe social and physical environment (security, 6th) are only moderately important.

Now let us place these American ratings in perspective by comparing them with the pan-cultural norms shown on the right side of Table 6. The rating of benevolence is a little above average, rather than signifying unusual concern for close others. Moreover, the rating of universalism is extraordinarily low (1.7 standard deviations below the pan-cultural norm). This suggests that these students care much less for strangers or needy members of out-groups than is typical across cultures. Instead, it appears that the average American student is exceptional in giving high priority to self-oriented desires. Achievement, hedonism, and power values are all well above average in importance (1.7, 1.1, and .7 standard deviations above the norms, respectively).

This comparative value profile is compatible with recent cultural analyses of Americans. Analysts describe them as entrepreneurial, acquisitive, and self-indulgent on one hand and lacking a commitment to the good of the community on the other (e.g., Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985; Etzioni, 1993). In contrast to most other industrialized Western nations, whose value profile is quite different, welfare socialism has not taken root in America. Americans' attitudes toward the equitable allocation of resources in society are what one might expect in a society where universalism values are relatively unimportant and achievement, power, and hedonism are relatively important.

With regard to conformity and tradition, two types of values that emphasize subordination of self in favor of socially imposed expectations, the average American student attributes them higher importance than the pan-cultural norms (.4 and .3 standard deviations, respectively). On the other hand, this average student attributes less importance than is common to self-direction, the value type opposed conceptually to conformity and tradition (Schwartz, 1992; .7 standard deviations below the norm).

The pattern of value priorities discerned through comparisons with the pan-cultural norms is especially compatible with analyses that compare the United States with Western

Europe (e.g., Bellah et al., 1985; Etzioni, 1993; Schwartz & Ros, 1995). The relative importance of tradition and conformity probably reflect the continuing influence of religion and of Puritanism in particular on life in America that distinguishes it from much of Western Europe (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1991). The relative importance of achievement and power values may reflect the centrality of the frontier experience and of large capitalist corporations on societal development in America (Hall, 1982; Trachtenberg, 1982). By using the pan-cultural norms, a picture of the values of the average American student emerges that is more accurate and informative than the understanding derived from examining ratings of value importance in isolation.

CONCLUSION

The argument of this article can be summed up as follows: When we focus on differences, the current study, like past research, reveals a great deal of variation in the importance of individual values both within groups and across societies. This variation in individual values is systematically related to differences in individual behavior (Feather, 1975; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1996; Seligman et al., 1996), and it arises from systematic differences in social experience (Kohn & Schooler, 1983; Rokeach, 1973). Clearly, a difference perspective provides significant insights. When we shift our focus to similarities, however, we achieve new insights.

1. There is a common pan-cultural baseline of value priorities: There is a striking level of agreement across societies regarding the relative importance of different types of values—a high correlation between the value hierarchy of almost all samples and the average hierarchy of many different samples.
2. The observed pan-cultural value hierarchy can tentatively be understood as reflecting adaptive functions of values in meeting three basic requirements of successful societal functioning, ordered by importance: cooperative and supportive primary relations, productive and innovative task performance, and gratification of self-oriented needs and desires.
3. It is only against the background of the pan-cultural normative baseline that we can accurately discern what is distinctive and therefore informative regarding the value priorities of the members of a particular group.

Differences are more salient and compelling than similarities. It may therefore be difficult to accept that a largely shared, pan-cultural value hierarchy lies hidden behind the striking value differences that draw our attention. Differences help us to identify the influences of unique genetic heritage, personal experience, social structure, and culture on value priorities. The pan-cultural hierarchy points to the bases of values in shared human nature and to the adaptive functions of values in maintaining societies. To gain a full understanding of human value priorities, we must take note of the interplay of both differences and similarities.

NOTES

1. For details on the reliability of the value type indexes, see Schmitt, Schwartz, Steyer, & Schmitt (1993). Note that the achievement value type refers to meeting social standards and attaining social approval, not to meeting personal standards. This differs from McClelland's "need for achievement," which resembles self-direction values (McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953).

2. The fact that the multidimensional spatial representation of relations among the single values revealed no extensive empty regions also supported the argument for comprehensiveness.

3. All means reported in this article are adjusted to eliminate national differences in use of the response scale by centering the means for each sample around 4.00, the approximate pan-cultural mean (see Schwartz, 1992).

4. These regions come from the classification in the *Outline of World Cultures* (Murdock, 1975), substituting Eastern Europe for Russia. Theoretical and empirical studies of world cultures suggest that the eight regions specified by Murdock probably capture the major distinctive, broad cultures of the world (Hofstede, 1982; Huntington, 1993; Schwartz, 1999; Schwartz & Ros, 1995). Giving equal weight to world regions is one of many potential weighting schemes for estimating pan-cultural norms. One could weight regions by the number of nations they include, for example, and nations and regions by their populations. Because national groups rather than individuals are usually the unit of comparison in cross-national studies, we preferred equal weighting of nations or regions.

5. In the set of representative and near-representative samples, North America was not represented. Even so, if we give equal weight to the other seven world regions, the means for the 10 value types correlated .99 with the unweighted means ($r_s = .96$).

6. Here we compare the values of the average individual in a sample. It is therefore legitimate to use the 10 individual-level value types. To understand cultural differences, however, comparisons should use dimensions derived from culture-level analyses, not the dimensions used here and derived from comparing individual persons (Hofstede, 1982; Schwartz, 1997, 1999; Smith & Schwartz, 1997).

7. We computed all mean Pearson correlations in this article using r to Z transformation.

8. In 75% of the random splits, 6 value types (benevolence, conformity, hedonism, tradition, stimulation, and power) shifted up or down one rank or less from their mean rank. The remaining value types shifted up or down two ranks or less. A recent study of 200 Israeli students provided further evidence to support the relative independence of the value hierarchy from method of measurement. The correlation between the means for the 10 value types, measured with the current instrument and with a new and very different instrument, was $r = .95$ (Schwartz et al., 1999).

9. Buss (1996) and Hogan (1996) take a related approach in explaining the presumed universality of the Big Five personality dimensions as reflecting evolutionary adaptation to group living. Our explanation of basic values adds an emphasis on societal requirements and attempts to explain the near-universality of the hierarchical order of the different types of values.

10. This does not mean that the pan-cultural value hierarchy reflects individual tendencies to respond in a socially desirable manner to the value survey. The personality variable of social desirability does not correlate consistently with the importance individuals attribute to the values high in the pan-cultural hierarchy (Schwartz et al., 1997).

11. We comment only on differences in the structured experience of individuals that may affect the importance of their personal values. We discuss the full range of factors that influence cultural or national differences in values elsewhere (Munene, Schwartz, & Smith, 2000; Schwartz, 1993; Schwartz & Bardi, 1997: Schwartz & Ros, 1995; cf. Hofstede, 1982). As noted in Note 5, cross-cultural or cross-national comparisons should use value dimensions derived from comparing cultures, not individuals.

12. We are grateful to Judith Howard, David Karp, Dan Landis, Renuka Sethi, James Starr, and Harry Triandis for providing these data.

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